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Abstract 
This essay discusses the requirements for the long-term acceptance of 
virtual currency as a financial medium of exchange by examination of 
fundamental criteria associated with the historical development of common 
tender and selected virtual currencies.  The relatively recent appearance of 
Internet-based transactions have necessitated developing virtual forms of 
payment such as virtual currencies.  According to the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) of the United States Treasury,
5
 virtual 
currencies are subject to regulation if that virtual currency has a substitutive 
purpose for facilitating the exchange of goods and services. 
Although governments can place stipulations on currencies, users of 
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common tender, including virtual currencies, expect at least three basic 
privileges for a virtual currency to evolve from conception to realization.  
First, a virtual currency must be considered intangible personal property 
similar to trademarks, copyrights, and patents.  Second, ownership disputes 
must be subject to a system such as a judicial proceeding or binding 
arbitration to resolve property as well as interest conflicts.  Finally, a virtual 
currency must be subject to similar regulation as other financial instruments 
(e.g., legal tender, scrip, and credit cards) used in facilitating transactions. 
One of the most common and critical aspects of safeguarding currency is 
protection against illegitimate representations of assets—that is, primarily 
against counterfeiting.  We discuss the regulatory authority and/or lack of 
authority, of the sovereign States of the United States to regulate the 
counterfeiting of financial instruments used as currency, including virtual 
currency.  Moreover, federal and foreign (non-U.S.) currencies are explicitly 
examined, but some virtual currencies are not regulated or authorized 
specifically by any government.  Can a currency without formal codification 
from a government be regulated by a sovereign State?  As financial 
transactions have shifted historically from various governments’ legal tender 
to combinations of government and private issuances and from the hard 
currency of coins and paper to electronic transactions, many States’ 
counterfeiting statutes are unclear or fail to consider that technological 
changes can impact legal and common tender.  The rise of transactions  
facilitated by virtual currencies and regulations protecting states from virtual 
counterfeiting is examined and discussed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Currency is a long established financial instrument used to facilitate 
exchanges of goods and services.
6
  In addition to being a medium of exchange, 
currencies must hold value and be expressed in common units.
7
  Furthermore, 
a currency can be legal tender,
8
 as defined by a regulating authority,
9
 or 
common tender by means of acceptance. Therefore, common tender would 
include many forms of virtual currency.  Additionally, FinCEN notes virtual 
currencies are subject to regulation if that virtual currency has a substitutive 
purpose for facilitating exchanging goods and services.
 10
  As technology has 
fostered an environment where many financial transactions can occur in 
cyberspace,
11
 technology has also promoted new types of financial instruments 
such as virtual currencies.  A current example of the promotion of virtual 
currencies is an experimental anonymous electronic payment technology 
known as MintChip.
12
  In April 2012, a competition began to create virtual 
apps for MintChip sponsored by the Royal Canadian Mint.
13
  The purpose of 
the competition is to aid in the evolution of physical money to include a virtual 
form of payment.
14
 
For this essay, United States currency is the current legal tender as 
authorized by the United States Congress, and as printed by the Bureau of 
Engraving and Printing
15
 of the United States Department of the Treasury
16
 
 
 6.  Keith Hart, Money is Always Personal and Impersonal, 23 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 12, 13 (2007); 
Stephen D. Williamson, Private Money and Counterfeiting, 88 FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. Q. 
37 (2002). 
 7.  Anatol Murad, The Nature of Money, 9 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 217, 217 (1943). 
 8.  Currency in the U.S. is subject to 31 U.S.C. § 5103, “United States coins and currency (including 
Federal reserve notes and circulating notes of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all 
debts, public charges, taxes, and dues.  Foreign gold or silver coins are not legal tender for debts.”  31 U.S.C. 
§ 5103 (2012). 
 9.  The United States Constitution defines the powers of Congress and reserves to it the authority to 
issue and regulate money.  U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8.  This occurs both explicitly and implicitly.  First, the 
Constitution explicitly provides that Congress is solely accorded the power “To coin Money, regulate the 
Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures.”  U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, 
cl. 5. The United States implicitly provides this authority to Congress by prohibiting the states from coining 
money.  U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 10, cl. 1 (stating “No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but 
gold and silver Coin as Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.”). 
 10.  FinCENa, supra note 5. 
 11.  Consumers can purchase cars, furniture (e.g., at http://www.overstock.com), groceries (e.g., at 
http://www.peapod.com), and airline tickets (e.g., at http://www.expedia.com) to name a few. 
 12.  Emily Jackson, Royal Canadian Mint to Create Digital Currency, TORONTO STAR (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://www.thestar.com/business/2012/04/11/royal_canadian_mint_to_create_digital_currency.html; The 
Royal Canadian Mint Challenged Software Developers to Create APPS for MintChip, the Evolution of 
Currency, DEVPOST (Oct. 2, 2013), http://mintchipchallenge.challengepost.com. 
 13.  DEVPOST, supra note 12. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  The Bureau of Engraving and Printing is a “bureau in the Department of the Treasury” with “duties 
and powers prescribed by the Secretary [of the Treasury].” 31 U.S.C. § 303 (2012).  The Bureau of Engraving 
and Printing was created during the Civil War to specifically deal with the problem of counterfeiting. Marcela 
M. Williams & Richard G. Anderson, Currency Design in the United States and Abroad: Counterfeit 
Deterrence and Visual Accessibility, 89 FED. BANK OF ST. LOUIS 371, 373 (2007). 
 16.  The Treasury of the United States is authorized in 31 U.S.C. § 302 by the simple language, “The 
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and as coined by the United States Mint.
17
  Bank Notes are financial 
instruments issued by banks.
18
  Foreign and non-U.S. currency is defined as 
legal tender issues by a government entity such as a foreign power.
19
  A virtual 
currency is an electronic or virtual common tender used as a medium of 
exchange that can be substituted for legal tender.
20
  However, article I, § 10, 
clause 1 of the United States Constitution appears to prohibit states from 
independently recognizing digital currency as a substitute for legal tender.  In 
addition to preventing States from minting their own money, article I §, 10, 
clause 1 of the United States Constitution prohibits States from accepting 
anything but “gold and silver coin” as “tender” in “payment of debts.”
21
 
To illustrate the concept of valid financial instruments tendered as 
payment and present the practical realization of virtual
22
 currency, we first 
must consider historical financial instruments (i.e., coins, paper, scrip, and 
tokens) used as currency.  By examining the historical use of these currencies, 
we can gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the evolution 
of said instruments to project what protections and assurances are necessary for 
virtual currencies.  These discussions are presented in Part II. 
 
United States Government has a Treasury of the United States.”  31 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).  However, its on and 
off again history began on July 4, 1840, when it was constituted by what was commonly known as the 
Independent Treasury Act, which was repealed the following year on Aug. 13, 1841, only to again be 
reenacted and expanded five years later on Aug. 6, 1846 (incorporated in part under former § 472 of U.S.C. 
Article 31).  At that time, the Treasury was designated as a depository where the actual money of the 
government—gold, silver, bullion, notes, and currency—was kept in kind as received from the public 
revenues, or deposited there by express authority of law, and where it remained the specific property of the 
government.  Intermingling with any other funds was not permitted, because the Treasurer was not authorized 
to make other deposits unless specifically authorized.  See Branch v. United States, 12 Ct. Cl. 281 (1876) 
(holding court-ordered deposit of seized cotton transferred from failed national bank was not a deposit into the 
United States Treasury because it was only being held in trust until the completion of court proceedings), aff’d 
100 U.S. 673 (1879). 
 17.  Congress’ authority to coin money is established in U.S. CONST. ART. I §, 10, cl. 1.  The United 
States Mint is established pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 304, which provides in subsection (a) that, “The United 
States Mint is a bureau in the Department of the Treasury.” 31 U.S.C. § 304 (2012). 
 18.  Banknote, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 174 (10th ed. 2014). 
 19.  Since legal tender only refers to U.S. government-issued money, the reference to foreign or non-
U.S. currency as legal tender, even if designating it as that of a foreign power, is incorrect.  U.S. CONST. ART. I 
§ 8, cl. 5 gives Congress authority to set the value of foreign money.  Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5151(b), the 
value of coins of a foreign country expressed in United States money is the value of the pure metal of the 
standard coin of the foreign country. 
 20.  FinCENa, supra note 5.  The previously defined term of virtual currency can be simply reduced to 
its ability to conduct transactions for goods and services within a community.  Community was not directly 
defined with a numeric concept, the virtual currencies function is of critical importance. 
 21.  James B. Thayer, Legal Tender, 1 HARV. L. REV. 73, 73 (1887) (stating that “[p]rovisions 
corresponding to these are found in Art. 9, Sects. 4 and 5, of the Articles of Confederation; and the language 
there used accounts in part for that of the Constitution. The clauses above quoted originally stood, in 
Pinckney’s Plan of a Federal Constitution.”). 
 22.  Although the terms virtual and digital are sometimes used interchangeably, we believe that the term 
“virtual” is superior to the term “digital” especially when describing this “alternative currency.”  Digital 
implies an association with a binary sequence or a limitation by some mechanism whereas virtual is a more 
complex and fluid description associated with technologies both in current use and not yet in use. 
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II. COINAGE, PRINTING AND GENERATION OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS  
USED AS CURRENCY 
Financial regulation is most effectively performed by governments,
23
 
traditionally by coining and printing national monetary instruments to be used 
as common currency.
24
  It has been so since antiquity.  The first coins may be 
traced to Asia Minor
25
 and the Lydian civilization in about 700 B.C.E.
26
 and 
paper money has been found in early civilizations (e.g., Chinese, Egyptians, 
India, and Scythia).
27
  The first instances of paper money can be attributed to 
the Tang Dynasty (617–907 B.C.E.).
28
  This is not surprising as the Western 
Zhou Dynasty (1100–771 B.C.E.) most certainly had developed the first 
accounting ledgers.
29
  This system was developed by the government to 
account for taxation, land ownership, and agricultural production.
30
  This was 
known as jingtian or “well-field.”
31
 
Since then, there have been many permutations of currency and money.  
According to Benjamin Franklin, money is an idea and not something 
tangible.
32
  When the American colonies were still in their infancy, gold and 
silver British coins were the legal tender
33
 as the colonists were subjects of the 
British Crown.
34
  Coinage was purposely kept in short supply by the British 
Government
35
 to control and extract money from the colonies.
36
  Franklin 
 
 23.  Williamson, supra note 6. 
 24.  Hart, supra note 6. 
 25.  Robert A. Mundell, The Birth of Coinage, COLUMBIA U. at 2 (Dep’t of Econ. Discussion Paper 
Series #:0102-08) (Feb. 2002) [hereinafter Mundell]. 
 26.  Id. at 14. 
 27.  Id. at 13. 
 28.  Niv Horesh, From Chengdu to Stockholm: A Comparative Study of the Emergence of Paper Money 
in East and West, 4 PROVINCIAL CHINA 68 (2012) [hereinafter Horesh].  In the Tang Dynasty, “paper scrip” 
created by the “counting houses” (guifang) became the financial medium of exchange known as “flying cash” 
(feigian). Id. at 68–69.  These practices later became a large scale paper money system backed by the Northern 
Song (960–1127 C.E.) government when war lead to a copper shortage which was a very important metal for 
making coin currency. Id. at 69; see also, Endymion P. Wilkinson, THE HISTORY OF IMPERIAL CHINA: A 
RESEARCH GUIDE (1973) [hereinafter Wilkinson].  The Tanglϋ shuyi of 737, “Tang Code with Commentary,” 
laid the foundation for a majority of eastern Asian penal statutes. Id. at 129.  While penal codes existed prior to 
the Tang Dynasty, their contexts cannot be fully comprehended as they are incomplete and fragmented. Id. at 
130–31. 
 29.  Maxwell Aiken & Wei Lu, The Evolution of Bookkeeping in China: Integrating Historical Trends 
with Western Influences, 34 ABACUS 220 (1998) [hereinafter Aiken]. 
 30.  Hong Yang & Xiohe Zhang, Economy and Trade (in Facts About China (Xiao-Bin Ji, ed.)), The 
H.W. Wilson Co.: NY (2003) at 257–258.  These authors place the Zhou Dynasty between 1045–221 B.C.E. 
Id. at 257 [hereinafter Yang]. 
 31.  Id. at 257. 
 32.  Thomas Levenson, Benjamin Franklin’s Greatest Invention, AM. HISTORY 1, 26 (2010) 
http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/69938 [hereinafter Levenson]. 
 33.  Id. at 27. 
 34.  See id. at 28 (discussing currency in the colonies during British rule). 
 35.  Daniele Besomi, Paper Money and National Distress: William Hauskisson and the Early Theories 
of Credit Speculation and Crises, 17 EUR. J. OF THE HIST. OF ECON. THOUGHT 49 (2010) [hereinafter Besomi].  
Although it is true that, by default, the British purposely kept coinage from the colonies, it was largely due to 
the pound sterling being readily converted from paper note to silver. Id.  This becomes clear when, in 1787, 
“the pound sterling was declared to be inconvertible.” Id.  Furthermore, a formal report was presented to the 
British government in 1810 in which it speculated that trade credit is largely responsible for the diminished 
value of the pound sterling. Id. at 54, 60.  “The business of a merchant is to buy cheap and sell dear.  His 
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knew these American colonies needed more money in circulation to further 
trade as well as opportunities for economic growth.
37
  Thus he postulated
38
 that 
a paper “promise” authorized by a government, such as a Commonwealth, 
could make up for the shortage of coins.
39
  A Commonwealth would issue and 
be responsible for this paper currency and thus not have the problems 
associated with the demand for instant convertibility into precious metals such 
 
general wish is to be able, for this purpose, to command as large a credit as possible.  He must consequently, 
upon abstract principle, be favourable to any system which is likely to give facility to the discount of 
commercial securities.  His interest, therefore, appears to be the same as that of the banker; whose profit 
increases with the extension of such discounts (Huskisson 1810: 141–44).”  Id.  Moreover, Mr. Huskisson 
became the Joint Secretary to the Treasury of England in 1804, a post he would later resume from 1807 to 
1809. Id. at 52.  At first, Mr. Huskisson’s economic philosophies, as applied to England, hold little impact on 
the newly established government of the United States of America, except that Mr. Huskisson was educated in 
France where he met Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 51.  Thus, in some fashion, we can 
assume that these lessons helped shape his financial ideology. 
 36.  Joseph A. Ernst, Genesis of the Currency Act of 1764: Virginia Paper Money and the Protection of 
British Investments, 22 THE WM. & MARY Q. 33 (1965) [hereinafter Ernst].  The primary method to protect 
British investments was to mandate the colonists to only provide payments for goods and services in pound 
sterling.  Id. at 33.  This was in accordance with the Currency Act of 1764, which was rooted in the Currency 
Act of 1751. Id.  If Virginia was not defaulting on its debts by 1754, creditors, mostly British merchants, 
would not have to seek a resolution.  Id. at 34.  As Virginia currency was subject to exchange with the pound 
sterling, as it was issued by the colonial government of Virginia, the exchange rate could significantly 
fluctuate: Going from 30 in April 1755 to 65 in April 1764 per pound sterling.  Id. at 46.  Moreover, political 
corruption—Mr. Robinson, the Treasurer of Virginia, stole ~£100,000 in notes that had been redeemed from 
the Virginia Treasury between 1755–1763 aimed for destruction and removal from the currency as these were 
being replaced by new issues—further eroding the faith in value of Virginia currency.  Id. at 50; see also 
Levenson, supra note 32.  As legal tender helps facilitate trade, the lack or shortage thereof creates a vacuum 
whereby other financial instruments, including common tender, are created.  Moreover, bartering can become 
prohibitive when buyers and sellers are trying to move larger amounts of goods; see also, Edwin J. Perkins, 
Counterfeiting Views on Fiat Currency: Britain and its North American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century, 
33 BUS. HISTORY 8 (1991) [hereinafter Perkins].  In fact, it was the previous bad experiences with fiat currency 
that was the basis for the primary objectives of the British government. Id. at 10. The stoppage of all payments 
on notes by England’s Exchequer in 1672 resulted in the default of ~£1.3 to £2.25 million; and France’s 
issuance of fiat currency under King Louis XV in 1716 and its subsequent failure in 1720 was promulgated by 
the Scotsman John Law.  Id. at 11.  These issuances quickly eroded the national economy through accelerated 
depreciation of currency being attributed to over-issuances of notes and the inability for these notes to be 
converted into specie or alternative assets.  Id. at 9–10.  Furthermore, Parliament did make exceptions to the 
Currency Act of 1764: Pennsylvania and New York; and subsequently amended this act in 1773 allowing fiat 
currency in the colonies.  Id. at 22.  The primary motive behind this series of Currency Acts was to stabilize 
the volatile colonial currency exchanges. Id. at 21; see also Jack P. Greene & Richard M. Jellison, The 
Currency Act of 1764 in Imperial–Colonial Relations, 1764–1776, 18 THE WM. & MARY Q. 485 (1961) 
[hereinafter Greene]. Conceivably, the 1773 amendment to the Currency Act of 1764 negates, or at least 
significantly diminishes, the colonial argument concerning their ability to regulate and print colonial notes and 
currencies. Id. 
 37.  Levenson, supra note 32, at 29. 
 38.  Although Benjamin Franklin, by some accounts, is credited with inventing paper currency 
(Levenson, supra note 32 at 28), he was actually a spirited advocate for the colonial, and later the Federal 
government, paper currency.  As previously discussed (see Mundell, supra note 25), paper currency preceded 
Mr. Franklin by about 1,000 years; see also, Shahriar Tavakol, Digital Value Units, Electronic Commerce and 
International Trade: An Obituary for State Sovereignty Over National Markets, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 1197 (1999) [hereinafter Tavakol].  According to Aristotle, “[m]oney has been introduced by 
convention as a kind of substitute for a need or demand, and . . . its value is derived not from nature but law 
and can be altered or abolished at will.” Id. at 1203. 
 39.  Levenson, supra note 32 at 29; see Hiram Price, The State Bank of Iowa, 1893 ANNUAL OF 
IOWA 266, 277 (1893) [hereinafter Price].  “It is certainly not fair to quote Dr. Franklin as favoring 
irredeemable, fiat money at this day, when one of his chief reasons, and the one on which all his others are 
based, for the issuance of that kind of paper promises, is that this country at that time produced no gold or 
silver, and was entirely, and was entirely dependent on foreign countries for coin money.”  Id. at 278. 
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as the pound sterling.  Moreover, this concept would foster and facilitate 
trade.
40
 
In 1690,
41
 Massachusetts
42
 began issuing the first government-sanctioned 
paper notes in the colonies.
43
  Consequently, too much money was eventually 
printed and the notes began to lose value against coins.
44
  Similarly, in 1723 a 
crisis in Pennsylvania required a reliable supply of cash and in 1729 the 
legislature finally decided to print £15,000 of paper notes which were backed 
by land and houses
45
 to ensure their value.  In addition to government issued 
notes, colonists could acquire notes from banks in the form of loans.
46
  The 
terms of such loans required the borrower to request from £25 to £100 in 
colonial paper with a repayment from 3% to 12.5% interest rate over eight to 
twelve years.
47
 
Subsequently, due to the scarcity of coins,
48
 an increased need for 
alternative forms of payment, such as paper currency, arose.
49
  The paper 
currency debate in early American history was intense and spirited according 
to Hiram Price: 
All profound thinkers on questions of money or finance, from the days of 
Alexander Hamilton to the present, no matter how widely they may have 
differed as to details, have been in accord as to the wisdom of so framing 
our financial system that all grades of society should be equally benefited 
and protected.  Equal rights to all and exclusive privileges to none, has 
been inscribed upon all banners of all parties.  ‘Money,’ says Hamilton, 
‘is with propriety considered as a vital principle of the body politic, and 
enables it to perform its essential functions.’  James Madison, in his 
comments on that clause of the Constitution which prohibits any State in 
the Union from issuing bills of credit as money, say: ‘The loss which 
 
 40.  Besomi, supra note 32, at 54, (“It is widely agreed that credit does [emphasis added] facilitate 
trade.”). 
 41.  Levenson, supra note 32, at 28. In 1682, the only colonial mint, located in Massachusetts, was 
abolished by order of the Crown. Thus, other foreign coins become critically important in facilitating trade. 
 42.  This is an important date to consider as we found that Massachusetts M.G.L.A. 267–68 has the 
most stringent criminal penalty for counterfeiting—life in prison. This is further discussed in section VIII.  
 43.  Levenson, supra note 32, at 28; see Perkins, supra note 36, at 13. The need to pay wages of 
returning soldiers caused the issuance of “Bills of Credit” which were “tax anticipation notes.” Id. at 13–14. 
 44.  Levenson, supra note 32 at 31. As the supply of paper currency increased, consumer confidence in 
the paper notes diminished resulting in the value of the paper to decrease relative to the precious metal coins. 
After all, paper currency was a conceptual plan in which the promise could be broken. With gold and silver 
coin, it can be converted based on the value of the metal as a commodity regardless of design, imprint, or 
issuing authority. Besomi, supra note 37 at 49. Inflation can result from, “an excessive issue of paper money.” 
Id. at 31, 50. 
 45.  Levenson, supra note 32, at 28. These were treated as secured bank loans in which the borrower 
had to eventually repay or risk property foreclosure. Moreover, it should be noted that Benjamin Franklin 
ultimately was awarded the Pennsylvania government contract to print the authorized paper currency. 
Furthermore, Franklin had secured contracts with Delaware and New Jersey. 
 46.  Perkins, supra note 36, at 15. 
 47.  Id. at 16. 
 48.  Price, supra note 39, at 268. During the 1800s, wealthy Americans hoarded gold and silver coins, 
including foreign coins. Id. Furthermore, stockpiling these coins provided an important opportunity to advance 
one’s social standing and political aspirations. Id. at 268. This may be linked to the ‘shortage’ of coins during 
the colonial period; see also Levenson, supra note 32, at 27; see also Perkins, supra note 36, at 11. 
 49.  Price, supra note 39 at 269. 
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America has sustained from the pestilential effect of paper money on the 
confidence between man and man, and on the morals of the people, and 
on the character of republican government, constitutes an accumulation 
of guilt which can be expiated in no other way than by voluntary sacrifice 
of it.’
50
 
The same author further says on this subject:  
‘The same reasons which show the necessity of denying to the States the 
power of regulating coin, prove with equal force that they ought not to be 
at liberty to substitute paper for coin.’  The use of the words ‘paper 
money,’ by Mr. Madison, is, at this day, a misnomer.  The paper issues of 
to-day are not money, but simply promises [alteration in original] to pay 
money. ‘Money,’ says Locke, ‘differs from uncoined silver in this: that 
the quality of silver in each piece of money is ascertained by the stamp it 
bears, which is a public voucher.’  Our lexicons describe money as being 
‘stamped metal, generally gold, silver or copper,’ never as paper.  Banks 
and bank paper create [alteration in original] no money, but under wise 
laws for their government, and when properly conducted, are incalculable 
benefit to the commerce of the Nation, and to all classes of people; and it 
is very doubtful if the business of the world could be successfully 
conducted without them.  It is safe to say that very few people are aware 
of the amount of labor performed by banks for little or no compensation.  
If all the banks in the Nation were closed, and all the people compelled to 
transact their business without the facilities which they furnish, for thirty 
days, there would be such a stirring up of the business community as has 
not been heard of since the firing of the first gun at Fort Sumter.
51
 
Private organizations, other than banks,
52
 that are not associated with the 
government can create their own financial instruments.
53
  Company-issued 
‘common tender,’ whether paper or metal, such as coal scrip is completely 
regulated by the issuer.
54
  While other companies (e.g., mostly in the 
 
 50.  Id. at 273. 
 51.  Id. 273–278. This discussion, as retold by Mr. Price in 1893, illustrates the importance of the 
underpinnings of the “modern” thoughts concerning the transition from bank notes, common tender, foreign 
coins to a standardized legal tender. Moreover, Mr. Price’s recollection of the “current” legal tender system, 
subsequent to the Legal Tender Act of 1862, is very similar to the current discussions concerning the 
movement towards virtual currencies, in consumer faith, legality of issuance, and of regulation. This will 
become more apparent in later parts of this paper (i.e., Part IV and Part V). Consider this statement by Mr. 
Price: “If, in the years of the coming future, State banks shall be substituted for the present National Banking 
System, it will be fortunate for the country if the new banks so established shall be as sound, conservative and 
reliable as the old State Bank of Iowa.” Id. at 293. The Bank of Iowa was established in 1858. Id. at 281. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  B.W. Barnard, The Use of Private Tokens For Money in the United States, 31 Q. J. OF ECON. 600 
(1917) [hereinafter Barnard].  In some cases, these private issuances were tokens. Id. at 600. “The early use of 
the term ‘token’ was to describe counters or jettons issued by traders to serve as small change.”  Id. at 600; 
Richard H. Timberlake, Private Production of Scrip-Money in the Isolated Community, 19 J. OF MONEY, 
CREDIT, AND BANKING 437 (1987) [hereinafter Timberlake]. 
 54.  Timberlake, supra note 53, at 438.  In some cases, scrip may be similar to tokens.  Barnard, supra 
note 53, at 601.  For example, “tradesman’s tokens” were redeemable by the merchant to the bearer of the 
token, and as such, tokens could circulate as smaller denominations of common tender passing among 
individuals until redeemed by merchant.  Id. at 602.  Moreover, tokens were used as currencies after 1776 in 
the colonies.  Id. at 604.  Ironically, most of these metal “coins” were “coppers struck at Birmingham 
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transportation and resources industries) issued scrip, of which coal scrip is 
perhaps the most well-known.
55
  Nevertheless, company scrip became a 
standard operating practice “. . . in the vicinity of the contributory resources, so 
were often located in isolated areas with low population densities significantly 
distant from commercial center.”
56
  Moreover, scrip circulated within the 
community where it was issued; and, in some instances, scrip could be 
exchanged in other regions.
57
  Scrip was not just confined to the United States; 
it was also found in Scotland and in Britain.
58
  Despite its wide use, scrip failed 
because it was not a true store of value as it was contingent upon company’s 
continued operations.
59
 
Although the norm, financial transactions do not have to be made from 
metal or paper.
60
  In 1931, a failed bank in the city of Tenino caused a critical 
shortage of United States Dollars, the legal tender used to facilitate trade, 
which subsequently caused a major disruption in financial transactions to the 
point where an innovative solution was developed.
61
  This solution was the 
establishment and creation of wooden scrip to be used as common currency.
62
  
The wooden currency represented a portion (approximately 25%) of the 
validated financial deposits on record at the failed bank.
63
  As the bank slowly 
liquidated its assets and declared liquidating dividends, some Tenino currency 
was redeemed based upon claims previously assigned to the Tenino Chamber 
of Commerce.
64
 
As innovative as company scrip
65
 and the wooden currency in Tenino,
66
 
virtual currency has emerged as a financial instrument that may be used as a 
common tender.
67
  Similar to coins and paper currencies, the creation of virtual 
 
[England] in 1783, 1785, and 1786 . . .” Id. at 604.  This practice continued until the United States Mint was 
fully operational and was able for currency.  Id. at 608.  This importation of token or “alternate currency” may 
have contributed to the rapid depreciation of fiat money after 1776.  Perkins, supra note 36, at 23.  
Furthermore, casino chips can be equated to tokens. 
 55.  Timberlake, supra note 53, at 439. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 443. 
 58.  Elaine Tan, Scrip as Private Money, Monetary Monopoly, and the Rent-Seeking State in Britain, 64  
ECON. HIST. REV. 237 (2011) [hereinafter Tan].  The use of scrip and the credit system (known as the Truck 
System) was prohibited by the British Parliamentary 1831 Truck Act.  Id. at 238.  This law mandated that 
workers must be compensated in legal tender.  Id. at 240.  Moreover, the Truck Act represents the consolidated 
effort to ban the issuance of private money since at least 1411. Id. at 242.  Private issuances were finally 
prohibited by the 1844 and 1845 Bank Acts. Id. at 244.  It should be noted that the primary author of the Truck 
Act was none other than the same Mr. Huskisson whom was introduced to Dr. Franklin and Mr. Jefferson.  
Besomi, supra note 35, at 51.  Ironically, Mr. Huskisson would never see the Truck Act come to fruition as 
“[h]e died in 1830 as the first victim of a railways accident at the inauguration of the Liverpool–Manchester 
line.”  Id. at 52. 
 59.  Timberlake, supra note 53, at 439. 
 60.  75 CONG. REC. 7665 (1932); Howard H. Preston, The Wooden Money of Tenino, 47 Q. J. OF Econ. 
343 (1933) [hereinafter Preston]. 
 61.  Preston, supra note 60, at 343. 
 62.  Id. at 344. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See generally Timberlake, supra note 53 (discussing the innovative nature of company scrip). 
 66.  See generally Preston, supra note 60 (illustrating the history and circumstances in which wooden 
currency emerged in Tenino). 
 67.  Timberlake, supra note 53, at 440. 
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currency is contingent upon available technology and it can be subject to 
unauthorized replication.
68
  Additionally, the supply of virtual currency must 
be able to meet the similar consumer expectations and demands of traditional 
currencies.
69
 
First Virtual Bank offered virtual currency accounts in 1994.
70
  More 
recently, transactions using virtual currency transfer a representative unit, or 
fraction of a unit, from peer-to-peer simply by modifying the owner of 
record.
71
  Virtual currency should not be confused with transactions using a 
Brokered Monetary Value
72
 (“BMV”) to facilitate trade as the primary function 
of a BMV is to safeguard the traders’ account details; and therefore, BMVs are 
not true concepts of virtual currency.
73
  Thus, we have limited our discussions 
on BMV’s.
74
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Normally, currency is central to trade as seen in the figure above.  Central 
to this figure is United States Legal Tender, which feeds into the world 
currency.
75
  Contingent on the acceptance of United States currency, three 
 
 68.  Williamson, supra note 6, at 55. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Bye-Bye Credit Cards, Hello Digital Money, 127 USA TODAY MAGAZINE (Jan. 1999), at 8. 
 71.  See generally Williamson, supra note 6 (discussing the transfer of virtual currency). 
 72.  Brokered Monetary Value (“BMV”) are third-party agents that act as financial intermediaries to 
facilitate in the exchange of products and services for currency.  An example of a third-party agent is PayPal.  
Stephen F. Quinn & William Roberds, Are On-Line Currencies Virtual Banknotes?, FED RES. BANK OF 
ATLANTA ECON. REV. 1, 10 (2003) [hereinafter Quinn].  PayPal, according to many State Laws, is actually a 
money transmitter. Id. at 11. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, 17 (2012) 
[hereinafter ECB].  Braintree Payment Solutions, LLC, is also a BMV owned by PayPal; see BRAINTREE 
PAYMENT SOLUTIONS, LLC, https://www.braintreepayments.com/ (last visited November 9, 2013).  Additional 
BMVs include AUTHORIZE.NET, http://www.authorize.net (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (owned by VISA); see 
also DWOLLA, https://www.dwolla.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2013); see also WEPAY, https://www.wepay.com 
(last visited Nov. 9, 2013). Although there are a number of BMVs, these are just a few that have experienced 
some success in virtual currency transfers. 
 73.  Bruce Champ, Private Money in Our Past, Present and Future, FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND 
ECON. COMMENT. (Jan. 2007), at 1, 2 [hereinafter Champ, Private Money]. 
 74.  Brokered Monetary Values would not necessarily be covered under counterfeiting as applied to 
currency replication and thus to generalize Brokered Monetary Values as such would be erroneous. 
 75.  Ruth Judson & Richard Porter, Estimating the Value of Counterfeiting U.S. Currency in Circulation 
Worldwide: Data and Extrapolation, FED. RES. BANK OF CHI. POL’Y DISCUSSION SERIES, 1 (2010).  
[hereinafter Judson].  “Cash U.S. dollars are used widely overseas.”  Id. at 5.  In fact, U.S. currency is used in 
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factors contribute to the value of this tender: United States reputation,
76
 
technology,
77
 and various regulations and policies.
78
 
However, when the value of currency is debatable,
79
 the willingness of 
individuals to engage in trade and accept less widely employed or potentially 
fraudulent financial instruments diminishes.
80
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure above traces the evolutionary path that this currency media has 
travelled.
81
  As presented earlier in Part II, colonial currency included British 
coins as well as foreign coins.  Due to a shortage of precious metals, coins 
gave way to various forms of paper currencies being issued by 
Commonwealths, banks, and other institutions.
82
  This is depicted as the first 
figure under the past history of U.S. Currency. 
In 1832, President Andrew Jackson was re-elected and refused to renew 
the charter the Second Bank of the United States.  Congress then enacted 
legislation that the government’s funds would be held by local banks instead of 
 
some nations as domestic currency.  Id. at 6. 
 76.  Tan, supra note 58, at 252.  As noted in early colonial times, reputation can significantly impact 
trade to the point that merchants and suppliers of good demand an alternative form of payment.  Id.  This 
would also be applicable in today’s global economy: If the consideration for goods and services is not 
satisfactory to the supplier, then the supplier can seek alternative markets to deliver those goods and services.  
In fact, with the advances in technology, communications, and transportation, it would be most likely that a 
supplier would just as easily locate a new market for the same goods and services then to engage in trade that 
may be detrimental to their organization. 
 77.  Judson, supra note 75, at 17 (explaining that technology includes the countermeasures to combat 
counterfeiting and to identify actual U.S. currency which is subsequently discussed). 
 78.  Tavakol, supra note 38, at 1203, (“Since money is a creature of law, the nature of foreign currency 
must be determined in accordance with the law of the foreign country that issues such currency.”) Id; see also 
Stephen S. Cohen & John Zysman, Countertrade, Offsets, Barter, and Buybacks: A Crisis in the Making, 28 
CAL. MGMT. REV. 41 (1986) [hereinafter Cohen]. 
 79.  Tavakol, supra note 38, at 1220. Debatable can also include instances where the value of currency, 
in relationship to other currencies, fluctuates widely and frequently. Id. Users of currency tend to avoid 
holding currency very long if the market is volatile. Moreover, the value of currency can shift according to 
monetary supply: The greater supply of money, the lower the value. Id. at 1221. 
 80.  Timberlake, supra note 53, at 443. 
 81.  Cohen, supra note 78. This figure excludes countertrades, offsets, barters, and buybacks as these 
transactions could be applied to past, present, and future trades. Id. at 41. 
 82.  Alan D. Watson, Counterfeiting in Colonial North Carolina: A Reassessment, 79 N.C. HISTORICAL 
REV. 182, 183 (2002). 
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a centralized bank.
83
 
This meant that banks could issue notes on the condition that 
designated securities, placed on deposit with state regulatory 
authorities, backed them.  In general, state authorities directed the 
printing and registering of bank notes and issued them to banks in 
amounts equal to the securities deposited.  Free banks had to redeem 
their notes at par (face value) for specie (coins minted by the U.S. 
Treasury) on demand, otherwise the state would close the bank. 
During this era, many different bank notes were circulating, making 
the ability to determine which notes were valid and sound, and 
which were risky, necessary for transactions to occur.  As a result, 
bank note reporters—newspapers that, like today’s financial pages, 
listed which bank notes were valid and what their market values 
were—were published and used as guides for bank note 
acceptance.
84
 
 Those days were long before the advent of cellular telephones and the 
ability to instantly post information to social media on the internet.  The task of 
bank note reporters to track the various types of paper money being printed by 
banks was daunting, and ultimately, futile: 
With minimum regulation, a proliferation of 1,600 local state-
chartered, private banks now issued paper money.  State bank notes, 
with over 30,000 varieties of color and design, were easily 
counterfeited.  That, along with bank failures, caused confusion and 
circulation problems.
85
 
 This situation continued almost unabated until Congress passed the 
“Legal Tender Act” in 1862, authorizing the minting of paper money not 
redeemable in gold or silver.
86
  This ended the long-standing policy of using 
only gold or silver in transactions, and it allowed the government to finance the 
enormously costly Civil War long after its gold and silver reserves were 
depleted.
87
  The Legal Tender Act allowed the government to print $150 
million in paper money that was not backed by a similar amount of gold and 
silver.
88
 
After the Civil War, or “War of the Rebellion,” Congress, in 1878, 
authorized the recirculation of these notes, and its authority to do so was 
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
89
  The Court said that the United 
States Constitution gave Congress the power to make the treasury notes of the 
 
 83.  Rob Wile, The Crazy Story of the Time When Almost Anyone in America Could Issue Their Own 
Currency, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 11, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/history-of-the-free-bank-
era-2013-2. 
 84.  Adam M. Zaretsky, Will that Be . . . Cash, Check, Charge or Smart Card?, REG’L ECONOMIST 
(Apr. 1996) at 8. 
 85.  Ron Pfiester, The History of U.S. Paper Money, RON’S CURRENCY, STOCKS & BONDS, 
http://www.ronscurrency.com/rhist.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2015). 
 86.  Philip W. Newcomer, The Illegality of Legal Tender, THE FREEMAN (Dec. 1, 1986), http://fee.org/ 
freeman/the-illegality-of-legal-tender. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Juilliard v. Greenman (Legal Tender Case), 110 U.S. 421, 426–27, 449–50 (1884). 
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United States legal tender in payment of private debts in time of peace as well 
as in time of war.
90
 
Although the case settled the narrow question of whether the reissued 
United States paper notes could be used by a citizen of Connecticut to pay a 
citizen of New York for 100 bales of cotton, it coupled with other “Legal 
Tender Cases” had a much wider ranging impact.  It legitimized as “legal 
tender” the notes of the United States government as payment of debts even 
when recirculated.
91
  In effect, those notes were not used as replacement for 
the equivalent value in gold; they were used as a representation of that value. 
As financial transactions have moved away from the transfer of coins and 
paper with the merchant towards the electronic transmission of representative 
cash, the future of United States currency may well yield to electronic 
representation of value stored as virtual dollars or its equivalent.  Historically, 
societies have continuously sought to improve “money” to protect its value and 
its functionality. 
In this Part II, we have briefly presented a historical overview of coinage, 
printing and the generation of financial instruments.  While there are many 
other examples of legal tender in the United States and also of issues of 
common tenders, the examples presented offer a diverse flavor of currencies.  
In either case, the value of currency becomes uncertain where financial 
instruments have been counterfeited.
92
  Counterfeiting currency devalues the 
financial instruments by erroneously increasing the supply of the currency.
93
  
Counterfeiting has been used as a method for countries to wage economic 
war
94
 and for individuals to unjustly enrich themselves.
95
 To protect the value 
and stability of economic markets, many governments specifically regulate 
financial instruments used as currency.
96
 This regulation includes measures to 
combat, deter, and detect counterfeiting.
97
  We define counterfeiting as the 
replication of a financial instrument used to obtain goods and/or services under 
false pretenses or to influence the value or acceptance of a currency.
98
 To 
understand the motive behind counterfeiting, one must consider the nature of 
both currency and virtual currency. 
III. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF CURRENCY AND VIRTUAL CURRENCY 
If it is a fact that money is the “life blood of trade and the wings of 
commerce,” then it follows as a consequence that the volume of 
money, or bank bills representing and redeemable in money (and no 
 
 90.  Id. at 449–50. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Watson, supra note 82, at 187. 
 93.  Id. at 188–89. 
 94.  Champ, Private Money, supra note 73. 
 95.  Louise I. Shelley, The Diverse Facilitators of Counterfeiting: A Regional Perspective, 66 J. INT’L 
AFFAIRS 19 (2012). 
 96.  William A. Lovett, The Revolution in U.S. Banking, 27 CHALLENGE 41 (1984); Bruce Champ, 
Stamp Scrip: Money People Paid to Use, ECON. COMMENTARY (Apr. 2008) [hereinafter Champ, Stamp Scrip]. 
 97.  Lovett, supra note 96. 
 98.  Williamson, supra note 6; Shelley, supra note 95. 
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other bank bills should be allowed), is an important factor in 
determining the condition of the financial health of a nation, and 
consequently of every State in the Nation.
99
 
Hard currency, that is coins and paper, is traditionally associated with a 
geographic area such as a region, State, or country; and as such, must be 
physically moved from one location to another.
100
  Furthermore, most laws 
regulating currency are linked to the geographic location
101
 of the buyers or 
senders and the sellers or receivers.
102
 
Additionally, hard currency can be categorized by its liquidity—the 
ability and speed at which an asset can be converted into cash on hand, the 
most liquid state—into two classifications (i.e., M1 and M2) in the United 
States.
103
 
The most liquid state is M1, which is composed of cash on hand
104
 while 
M2 consists of M1 plus savings accounts.
105
  Prior to 2006, M3 consisting of 
M2 and by default M1 plus long-term investments and deposits exceeding 
$10,000 was an additional category of classification.
106
  Considering that hard 
currency is categorized in economic terms based on each user’s ability to first 
gain access to it and then to utilize it, then so too should virtual currency use 
the same definitions.
107
  However, there are significant distinctions between 
tangible currencies and virtual currencies. 
According to FinCEN,
108
 
In contrast to real currency, “virtual” currency is a medium of 
exchange that operates like a currency in some environments, but 
does not have all the attributes of real currency.  In particular, virtual 
currency does not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction. This 
guidance addresses “convertible” virtual currency.  This type of 
virtual currency either has an equivalent value in real currency, or 
acts as a substitute for real currency. 
Thus, a virtual currency is a medium of exchange for goods and services 
both tangible and intangible.
109
  This is an important distinction as some virtual 
 
 99.  Price, supra note 39, at 287. 
 100.  Tavakol, supra note 38, at 1205. 
 101.  See S.E.C. v. Prater, 2005 WL 2585269, at *5 (D. Conn. Aug. 24, 2005) (applying the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 102.  Tavakol, supra note 38, at 1222. 
 103.  R. Glenn Hubbard & Anthony P. O’Brien, MACROECONOMICS 460–62 (4th ed. 2013). 
 104.  Id. at 460. (“M1 The narrowest definition of the money supply: The sum of currency in circulation, 
checking account deposits in banks, and holdings of traveler’s checks.”) Id.  It should be noted that “Before 
1980, U.S. law prohibited banks from paying interest on checking account deposits.”  Id. at 462. Thus, M1 
currency is fundamentally assets that are expected to be consumed in the short term—less than twelve months. 
 105.  Id. at 462. (“M2 A broader definition of the money supply: It includes M1 plus savings account 
balances, small denomination time deposits (short-term (i.e., less than twelve months) certificates of deposit), 
balances in money market deposit accounts in banks, and non-institutional money market fund shares.”). Id. 
 106.  Discontinuance of M3, Fed. Reserve Statistical Release, http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/ 
h6/discm3.htm (Mar. 9, 2006) (Noting that the computation and estimation of M3 ended on or about March 23, 
2006). Id. Moreover, this illustrates that the way “we” view currency does indeed change according to its 
utility to the consumer. 
 107.  GLENN P. HUBBARD & ANTHONY P. O’BRIEN, MACROECONOMICS 460–62 (4TH ED. 2013). 
 108.  FinCENa, supra note 5. 
 109.  Audrey Guinchard, Crime in Virtual Worlds: The Limits of Criminal Law, 24 INT’L REVIEW OF 
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currencies do not meet this definition.
110
  For example, virtual currencies 
which are part of massive multiplayer online games (MMOG)
111
 are not 
considered true virtual currencies as these are virtual currencies are intended to 
be used entirely within the confines of the game.
112
  Although some virtual 
currencies for these MMOG can be purchased from selected exchanges
113
 or 
other players, the virtual currency cannot be used to purchase goods and 
services outside of the MMOG; and therefore, is not regulated by FinCEN.
114
 
Currency needs to be easily transportable, widely accepted and hold its 
value.
115
  Counterfeiting diminishes acceptability and reduces the value of a 
 
LAW, COMPUTERS & TECH. 175 (2010) [hereinafter Guinchard]. Virtual currency should be exchangeable for 
goods and services both virtual and “real” currencies as well as exchangeable to other currencies. Id. 
 110.  Tavakol, supra note 38, at 1199. Virtual currency would also include e-money, e-cash, and Digital 
Value Units (DVU). Id. at 1199, 1204. Moreover, minor distinctions are made between the types of virtual 
currency. Id. at 1204. “E-money is the general term for tokens of monetary value that takes digital form.”  Id. 
“E-cash, as the replacement for banknotes and coins, is e-money for small transactions.  Finally, DVUs are the 
basic units of denominations of e-money and e-cash.” Id; see also, Ralph E. McKinney, Jr., Lawrence P. Shao 
& Dale H. Shao, Can Digital Worlds Simulate Reality? Using Virtual Reality as an Education Tool, 11 INT’L 
JOURNAL OF BUS. RESEARCH 157 (2011) [hereinafter McKinney]. 
 111.  McKinney, supra note 110. Massive Multiplayer Online Games (MMOG) are internet-based video 
games with a greater emphasis on interactions among players. Id. at 160.  In fact, this social interaction is a 
critical attraction to the gaming platform which can sometimes create distinct followings associated with the 
game. Id. at 157. Some examples of MMOG include World of Warcraft by Blizzard Entertainment, Runescape 
by Jagex Ltd., as well as many others. Id. at 161.  MMOG are classified as closed virtual currency schemes as 
there is no true legitimate connection for conversion to the economy ECB. Id. at 13. The next classification is 
contingent on the convertibility of virtual currency (unidirectional or bidirectional) into legal tenders such as 
the United States Dollar, the Euro and the Yen. Id. at 14.  Unidirectional is the flow from the legal tender into 
a virtual currency that may be redeemed for some virtual goods or services. Id. at 14. Examples of 
Unidirectional virtual currency schemes are Facebook Credits and Nintendo Points. Id. In the case of 
bidirectional virtual currency schemes, the conversion can be from legal tender into virtual currency and then 
back to legal tender. Id. Examples of these currencies are Bitcoins, Litecoins and Peercoins. It is the 
bidirectional virtual currency schemes that are the primary focus of this paper. 
 112.  McKinney, supra note 110. 
 113.  McKinney, supra note 110. An example of a selected exchange is eBay. Moreover, individuals may 
purchase these currencies from other players. Id. at 162. 
 114.  Stacey L. Schreft, Clicking with Dollars: How Consumers Can Pay for Purchases from E-Tailers, 
2002 ECON. REVIEW 37 [hereinafter Schreft]. Ms. Schreft states “[t]he term ‘deposit’ refers to claims of 
monetary value” which solidifies the fact that MMOG currencies are contained within the gaming environment 
without any claims for “real currency.” Id. at 39.  Furthermore, she presents that internet purchases using such 
methods as credit cards, debit cards, and electronic checks are in fact only remote purchases where trade is 
facilitated and is backed by “real currency.” Id. at 46; Rónán Kennedy, Virtual Rights?  Property in Online 
Game Objects and Characters, 17 INFO. & COMMC’N TECH. LAW 95 (2008) [hereinafter Kennedy].  
Moreover, “MMORPG (massive multiplayer online games) and VWs (virtual worlds) are developing at a rapid 
pace, creating new markets and throwing up new legal problems.  The artificial creation of scarcity leads to 
conflicts over resources, trading in virtual property and instances of fraud and theft.  Some game developers 
deal with this by using contract law to outlaw real world trading; others encourage and facilitate it, while 
denying that this has real world consequences.  As the technology develops and becomes more widely used, 
this argument will not be tenable.  An examination of the theoretical foundations of property rights also leads 
to the conclusion that, with time, the interest of players in property rights will outweigh those of game 
developers.  This challenges traditional notions of intellectual property and authorship, although in a somewhat 
unfocused way.  Nonetheless, it is clear that the phenomenon of online games and real world trading in virtual 
property is an important element in the accelerating pace of change in intellectual property law.” Id. at 104. 
This is an important notation as our processes are continuously being automated with increased efficiency 
through technology, with innovation being driven by technology “we” are likely to utilize the “resources” from 
the same technology to solve ‘our’ problems. 
 115.  See Tavakol, supra note 38, at 1200 (noting that DVUs are the smallest measurement or 
denomination of a virtual currency). 
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currency.
116
  Thus, strong regulations deterring counterfeiting to maintain 
confidence in the currency are critical.
117
  Consequently, do States have 
regulatory power concerning counterfeiting United States currency, bank 
notes, and foreign (non-U.S.) currency?  Furthermore, can States regulate 
virtual currencies?  From our research, we are the first to address these 
concerns in such depth while considering every State statute.
118
 
As previously mentioned, financial tools such as charge cards act as 
temporary loans for purchases, but are not considered legal tender.
119
  Virtual 
currency will eventually dominate as the major form of common tender.
120
  To 
become widely accepted as a common tender, certain requirements must be 
met.  The next section discusses basic requirements for virtual currency to 
become an accepted, and legal, form of legal tender.
121
 
IV. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE OF 
VIRTUAL CURRENCY 
As virtual currency is a common tender without the same government 
regulation and oversight as legal tender, the ability to conduct transactions 
using virtual currency can be limited.
122
  Furthermore, individuals must have 
faith in the stability of a common tender and that common tender must have a 
utility that serves the needs in facilitating trades for an individual.
123
  Thus, the 
primary question is how can the concept of virtual currency be realized? 
Considering the historical successes, mishaps and failures of previous 
hard currencies and the distinction that virtual currencies have no true physical 
substance, we postulate that: (1) A virtual currency must be considered 
intangible personal property similar to trademarks, copyrights,
124
 and 
patents;
125
 (2) Ownership disputes must be subject to a system such as a 
 
 116.  Watson, supra note 82. 
 117.  Guinchard, supra note 109. Confidence in the representativeness of a currency, that is, what the 
conceptual understanding of stated value of the currency is, in fact, the actual value in which users of that 
currency will recognize. Id. at 175. As noted, virtual currencies are conceptual by nature and may be subject to 
a greater distrust especially since a user of that common tender relies on other users for its value. Id. at 176. 
Moreover, “at the basis of fraud there is a lie and without assurances, especially the ability for one to seek a 
resolve in a dispute through the court system or other regulatory body or administrative agency, then the 
likelihood of higher confidence cannot truly be obtained.” Id. 
 118.  Judson, supra note 75 at 8, “[f]ew papers on counterfeiting . . . .” 
 119.  Schreft, supra note 114, at 46. 
 120.  Tavakol, supra note 41, at 1199. Virtual currency can reduce transaction fees and may be more 
convenient for consumers. Id. Moreover, this is a natural evolution from metal to paper to virtual currencies.  
However, our intention is to examine virtual currency in general. Thus, we look at the overall macro concept 
as defined by FinCEN. FinCENa, supra note 5. 
 121.  Infra Part IV. 
 122.  Tavakol, supra note 38. 
 123.  Guinchard, supra note 109. 
 124.  Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 
(2012) [hereinafter Tushnet]. Copyrights can be difficult to determine as “physical artifacts,” in the cases of 
books, coins, and so forth, may be held to different standards than digital or virtual representations. Id. at 756–
57. 
 125.  Julia A. Gladstone, Exploring the Role of Digital Currency in the Retail Payments System, 31 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 1193 (1997) [hereinafter Gladstone]. Similarly, Gladstone notes that “the original digital 
denomination can and is intended to be broken into smaller amounts. This divisibility feature sets digital 
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Judicial Proceeding or Binding Arbitration to resolve property conflicts;
126
 and 
(3) A virtual currency must be subject to similar regulation as other financial 
instruments (e.g., legal tender, scrip, and credit cards) used in facilitating 
exchanges.
127
  Each is defined subsequently. 
First, a virtual currency must be considered a form of intangible personal 
property.
128
  Already the IRS
129
 and the U.K.
130
 have issued guidelines 
 
currency apart from similar traditional payment instruments.”  Id. at 1201.  Thus, any transferring of virtual 
currency destroys the original encrypted data stream of value we know potentially as the total represented 
value of virtual currency contained within a virtual wallet and creates at least two encrypted data streams of 
value: One for the sender to express the value of virtual currency less the transfer to the receiver whom also 
obtains an encrypted data stream of value.  Hence, unlike traditional forms of payments, this constant creation, 
destruction, and creation is most similar to intangible personal property as we postulate. See also Henry E. 
Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Property].  
“Property law is a modular system. It helps define what a thing is in the first place and why we should care. It 
gives content to the notion of a “law of things.”  Content is what is lacking in the bundle picture—so lacking 
that the bundle fails to be a theory of property at all.  Instead of positing detachable sticks that directly serve 
goals like autonomy, privacy, investment, planning, and appropriability according to criteria of efficiency, 
fairness, and morality, the modular theory of property explains how property law furnishes some basic 
building blocks of private law.  Modular property manages the complexity of human interactions by using 
exclusionary strategies to treat these interactions as nearly decomposable and by delineating semi-transparent 
boundaries around complementary clusters of attributes.  It then specifies the interface between the modular 
components of property through governance strategies that make more direct reference to uses and purposes, 
as in the law of nuisance, covenants, and zoning.  This interface also contains the very important equitable 
safety valves that allow the baselines of property to be simple without being vulnerable to opportunists.  In 
contrast to the bundle-of-rights picture, the modular theory captures how a great number of features of 
property—ranging from its in rem aspect, the right to exclude, and the residual claim, through alienability, 
persistence, and compatibility, and beyond, to deep aspects like recursion, scalability, and resilience—follow 
from the modular architecture.  The modular platform allows communication with actors near and far in a 
parsimonious manner.  Modular property is neither absolute nor formal across the board, but it helps explain 
how and when we incur the cost of delineating property rights in a complex world. It furnishes the things that 
property as a law of things contributes to private law.”  Id. at 1725–26.  Essentially, property rights are not 
clear and as technology advances, so likely would disputes increase surrounding digital and virtual property 
protections.  Id. at 1698.  It is in our best interests to define such virtual property as “a platform for the rest of 
private law.”  Id. at 1691.  However, not everyone agrees with the concept of property law being a “modular 
system.”  See also Eric R. Claeys, Responding to Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 133 (2012) (noting disagreements with Smith); Thomas W. Merrill, Responding to Henry E. Smith, 
Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 151 (2012) (noting reservations about whether modularity 
is an adequate picture of property). 
 126.  See Tavakol, supra note 38, at 1200 (suggesting that, on an international level, this may be more 
difficult to accomplish). 
 127.  Quinn, supra note 72, at 1. Part of this regulation would be the collection of taxes; see Tavakol, 
supra note 38, at 1206. 
 128.  As virtual currency is not associated with real estate, its classification into personal property is more 
accurate.  In addition, virtual currencies are unique in the fact that they are used as currency without any 
physical representation of currency—only conceptualized and presented in digital form, which cannot be 
handled outside of an image.  Considering that prior coins and notes were also concepts with a physical 
presentation that could be readily transferred from one hand to the next hand, virtual currencies can only be 
transmitted via one device to another device.  Even though technology has been used as a method to facilitate 
“hard” currency transactions, in the case of credit and debit cards, virtual currency is unique because the 
technology cannot be separated from the transactions.  The transaction and currency are not independent 
events but dependent events that are not mutually exclusive. 
 129.  I.R.S. Notice 2014-21 (Mar. 25 2014) [hereinafter Notice 2014-21] (“In general, the sale or 
exchange of convertible virtual currency, or the use of convertible virtual currency to pay for goods and 
services in a real-world economy transaction, has tax consequences that may result in a tax liability.  This 
notice addresses only the U.S. federal tax consequences of transactions in, or transactions that use, convertible 
virtual currency, and the term ‘virtual currency’ as used in Section 4 refers only to convertible virtual currency. 
No inference should be drawn with respect to virtual currencies not described in this notice.”  Moreover, 
virtual currencies are not considered foreign currencies or currency but property.  Id. at 2.  “For federal tax 
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classifying virtual currencies as property.
131
  This is an important designation 
as the type of property, based on its tax treatment, aligns virtual currency as 
“property” similar to stocks, bonds, commodities and futures.
132
  Furthermore, 
intellectual property
133
 falls under this personal property definition.
134
  It is the 
intangible (i.e., incorporeal) nature of these virtual assets that are most 
 
purposes, virtual currency is treated as property. General tax principles applicable to property transactions 
apply to transactions using virtual currency.”  Id.  Furthermore, these virtual currencies are treated similar to 
stock and bonds with gains and losses being the taxable event.  Id.  The acquisition of virtual coins through 
mining also constitutes a taxable event this virtual “property” which is likely a self-employed action provided 
that the miner does not have an employment relationship.  Id.  If there is an employment relationship, then 
“Payments made using virtual currency are subject to backup to backup withholding to the same extent as 
other payments made in property.”  Id. at 5.  Notice 2014-21 was based and builds upon the findings of 
FinCENa. 
 130.  HM Revenue & Customs, Revenue and Customs Brief 9 (2014): Bitcoin and Other 
Cryptocurrencies, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS (Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ 
revenue-and-customs-brief-9-2014-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies/revenue-and-customs-brief-9-2014-
bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies [hereinafter HMRC] (designating virtual currencies as property which may 
be subject to taxation.  However, this policy notes that the European Union can adjust or other modify this 
definition of virtual currency and alter its subsequent treatment as property.). 
 131.  Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Risks to Consumers Posed by Virtual Currencies, 
CONSUMERFINANCE.GOV (Aug. 2014), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/f/201408_cfpb_consumer-
advisory_virtual-currencies.pdf [hereinafter CFPB] (noting that virtual currencies are not covered by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.  Additionally, there are significant risks of loss associated with this 
property that significantly deter the ability to obtain insurance on these “properties.”  Other distinct risk 
characteristics of virtual currencies are its volatility and its relative newness outside of generally smaller user 
group. This expanded use of virtual currencies has made this “property” highly experimental which 
programming and encryption issues may yield to transaction problems that give rise to ownership disputes. For 
example, the loss of a digital wallet, a data wipe, or a cyber attack can destroy any trace of a “claim” for these 
virtual assets and without a claim, recovery of damages is not assured.). 
 132.  This is an important observation as many conversions and purchases of virtual currency are linked 
to the speculation of an investment and the ability to acquire greater wealth recognized by the sale of this 
virtual currency as an investment.  Thus, some important questions arise concerning what the practical 
difference is between an investment and a currency.  Although some currencies are sought as an investment, 
the majority of that currency is circulating, as intended, with the purchase of goods and services.  The super 
speculative investments into some currencies are similar to the call to buy precious metals as noted by Pat 
Boone’s famously urging of “Don’t wait to buy gold, buy gold and wait” for Swiss America. How to Protect 
Yourself from Investment Gold Scams, SWISS AM. (Oct. 26, 2014) https://www.swissamerica.com/ 
offer/noscam.php.  This bring into question, is a virtual currency a common tender or an investment similar to 
a partitioned share in a virtual commodity?  We believe that whatever the answer to this question is, the 
designation of intangible personal property would be applicable to both. 
 133.  See generally ECB, supra note 72, at 31 (noting that a significant dispute between the operators of 
the Second Life virtual currency of Linden Dollars and Ailin Graef arose after changes in the intellectual 
property rights agreement to which Mrs. Graef could not refuse. Mrs. Graef is significant to virtual currency as 
she was the first individual to become a millionaire through the conversion of digital assets and enterprises. 
She was able to accomplish this through exercising her intellectual rights in Second Life.). 
 134.  Although the definition of intellectual property can be used to identify some virtual currencies with 
respect to creation, the general classification of virtual currencies has been as an intangible personal property. 
(E.g., Notice 2014-21, supra note 129; FinCENa, supra note 5; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
14-496, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES: EMERGING REGULATORY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
CHALLENGES (May 2014), www.gao.gov/assets/670/663678.pdf [hereinafter GAO-14-496]; HMRC, supra 
note 130 (noting that virtual currencies must be dissected individually in determining which regulatory 
agencies can be best matched to those characteristics of that virtual currency.  Furthermore, it may be 
necessary to issue additional guidelines in dealing with virtual currencies as technology is continuously 
moving it forward.  For the purpose of this article, we defer to the general definition that virtual currency in its 
current state and in its expected future state will fit the definition of an intangible personal property.  Further 
classification may occur but only after the emergence and widespread use of multiple virtual currencies.  We 
anticipate this system to primary rank and classify the virtual currencies with respect to their performance 
against each other similar to the rankings of various stocks and bonds.). 
No. 2] COIN, PAPER, AND VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 291 
important.  Virtual currency, unlike stocks and bonds,
135
 can be permanently 
lost, mislaid, and abandoned.
136
  As with any property, individuals will assert 
their “rights” to that property—legitimate or otherwise.  Therefore, it is 
essential to have methods for those property rights to be scrutinized and 
decided. 
Second, disputes must be resolved through a formal mechanism
137
 that 
both is legitimately recognized to render decisions and has the ability to 
enforce or facilitate the enforcement of those judgements.
138
  This formal 
mechanism first needs to identify common terminology and issues concerning 
transactions.
139
  These can very well be adopted from current laws concerning 
 
 135.  Based upon the guidelines issued by Notice 2014-21 and HMRC, the stocks and bonds are the most 
similar property identified to virtual currencies by governments.  Notice 2014-21, supra note 129; HMRC, 
supra note 130. 
 136.  For personal property, the terms lost, mislaid, and abandoned have significant meaning.  Personal 
property that is lost or mislaid can eventually be found by someone.  The same is said about abandoned 
property is that someone can find it and lay claim to it. These distinctions between lost, mislaid, and abandon 
concern the owners intent with the property—to retain or not to retain.  However, it is not the owner’s intent 
that we focus on, but the virtual currency’s ability as designated as personal property to be found and claimed. 
In fact, stock and bonds can be “located” even if the owner is not designated.  Consequently, virtual currency 
is not that simple and may be more complex considering that some virtual currencies are decentralized and 
anonyms.  As a result, certain “blocks” or sequences of virtual currency (similar to the serial numbers on 
United States currency notes) can be identified.  But, the reissuances of many of these virtual currencies cannot 
necessarily occur because of the finite properties built into virtual currencies to protect from over issuance. If 
virtual currencies were limitless, then everyone could conceivably acquire infinite wealth, which by default, 
would devalue the entire currency similar to the incidents of hyperinflation with the German Mark (Deutsche 
Mark) after the First World War.  In essence, those virtual currencies that cannot be claimed through 
identification are “held in infinity” by no one.  This is why we believe that regulation is of virtual currency is 
critical and we outline evidence for this in more detail in the subsequent section. 
 137.  We believe that a formal mechanism would include a mixture of judicial courts, both Federal and 
State, actions from regulatory agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission, FinCEN, the Internal 
Revenue Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and more), third-party arbitration, and limited self-
regulation. 
 138.  See CFPB, supra note 131 (identifying that many virtual currencies are not recognized as legal 
tender or common tender. In fact, there have been several formal complaints filed from users seeking relief 
from losses. Consequently, many of these complaints have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). 
 139.  Several rulings have been issued to clarify minor points that specifically relate to the exchange of 
virtual currency.  See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2014-R0001, 
APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATION TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY MINING OPERATIONS (Jan. 30, 2014) 
[hereinafter FinCENb] (noting that a miner is the original “creator” or individual that first acquires a virtual 
currency and as such is not a money transmitter as defined by FinCENa.  This ruling is very similar to the 
Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 where a different statis is placed on original purchases and 
second owners, respectfully, of stocks.  Moreover, this is in line with the rulings by the IRS pursuant to Notice 
2014-21). DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2014-R0002, APPLICATION OF 
FINCEN’S REGULATION TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY MINING OPERATIONS (Jan. 30, 2014) [hereinafter FinCENc]; 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2014-R0011, APPLICATION OF 
FINCEN’S REGULATION TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY MINING OPERATIONS (Oct. 27, 2014) [hereinafter FinCENd]; 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, FIN-2014-R0012, APPLICATION OF 
FINCEN’S REGULATION TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY MINING OPERATIONS (Oct. 27, 2014) [hereinafter FinCENe].  
These rulings do address some key points, there are significant differences in digital, virtual and 
cryptocurrencies. As such, many of these rulings are so specific that they maybe only applicable to a few select 
virtual currencies and entities that act as transmitters and exchanges of virtual currencies.  These rulings are 
supporting evidence that virtual currencies are being considered significant influences upon the U.S. economy 
and its citizens.  Moreover, these rulings indicate that public policy is not interested in suppressing the 
innovation of virtual currencies, but making the transactions of virtual currencies more transparent. 
Furthermore, we believe that these rulings are establishing a national framework for regulation and acceptance 
of virtual currencies which is essential in both protecting the national economy but also providing some 
minimum protections for individuals using virtual currencies. On May 7, 2014, the SEC issued this statement, 
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legal or common tender uses, provided that virtual currencies were considered 
such.
140
  A report issued by the Financial Action Task Force
141
 provides a 
common ground reference of critical terminology that is essential in making a 
standardized platform for the operation of virtual currencies. It is these critical 
definitions and elimination of ambiguity and uncertainty in treatment of virtual 
currencies that will help facilitate dispute resolution.
142
  As noted above, 
governments have been and continue to review “what is” virtual currency in 
terms of property.
143
  The regulatory entity needs not be a governmental 
organization but conceivably could be the issuer of the virtual currency 
provided certain assurances were in place.
144
  Dispute resolution reduces 
volatility in price and facilitates a more stable financial instrument, as most 
common definitions place virtual currencies, over the long term.  For dispute 
resolution to be successful, it is necessary for some financial regulation to 
occur, even if it is self-regulation. 
Thirdly, financial regulation of virtual currencies is necessary to ensure 
that the general public is not at a significant risk of loss or harm.
145
  This 
sentiment is not just focused in the United States or in the United Kingdom, 
but also many other foreign governments as virtual currencies have no 
geographic boundaries nor borders with the aid of the World Wide Web.
146
  
The primary reasons given for regulation are to deter money laundering and 
terrorism.
147
  Outside of preventing criminal activities through regulating 
 
“Using Bitcoin may limit your recovery in the event of fraud or theft.” SEC, Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other 
Virtual Currency-Related Investments, SEC. (May 7, 2014), http://sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-
bulletins/investoralertsia_bitcoin.html. Moreover, the SEC emphasized that “A new product, technology, or 
innovation—such as Bitcoin—has the potential to give rise both to frauds and high-risk investment 
opportunities.” Id. 
 140.  See generally id. 
 141.  Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks, Fin. Action Task Force (June 
2014) [hereinafter FATF] (explaining that FATF is an inter-governmental think tank charged with promoting 
policies for anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CFT) based in Paris, France (e.g., 
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org). 
 142.  See generally id. (listing key definitions for virtual currencies) 
 143.  GAO-14–496, supra note 134. 
 144.  See FATF, supra note 141 (identifying that virtual currencies such as Bitcoin have been used to 
commit crimes against people and public interests which required several government agencies to cooperate in 
stopping these actions. Most notably is the use of Bitcoins to facilitate human trafficking, prostitution, and the 
sale of drugs on Silk Road an internet site that brought buyers and sellers together. It was this anonymity that 
fostered the economic growth of this underground economy into the mainstream markets similar to eBay and 
Craigslist.). 
 145.  See generally ECB, supra note 72, at 27 (noting two U.S. Senators, Charles Schumer (D) of NY 
and Joe Manchin (D) of WV, started campaigning against all forms of virtual currencies since June 2011. 
Moreover, by letter dated Feb. 26, 2014, Manchin further advocates the necessity for regulation of Bitcoin and 
by extension virtual currencies and cryptocurrencies to the primary agencies of the United States have 
financial oversight, influence and control over matters of currencies.). 
 146.  Id. at 10. (noting financial instruments (e.g. scrip, stamps, and common tender) were mostly 
confined to a limited geographic region). Lovett, supra note 96; Tan, supra note 58; Tavakol, supra note 38, at 
1203). But with virtual currencies, growth beyond the geographic region is not dependent on the 
manufacturing of representative “tokens.” Nor is it contingent on financial intermediaries. It is contingent upon 
compatible technology and platforms. 
 147.  See INTERPOL, http://www.interpol.int/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) (explaining that INTERPOL’s 
mission is to combat criminal activities, including illicit financial transaction, through the cooperative efforts 
of a multinational police force. It is the legal status of virtual currency and the intention of the transactions of 
virtual currency that INTERPOL concerns itself.  With increasing use of virtual currencies to conduct criminal 
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virtual currency, governments use regulation as a means to levy taxation.
148
  
Beyond criminal activity and taxation, regulation is used to reduce risks 
associated with the virtual currency.
149
  Risk minimization is an important part 
of attracting users of a virtually currency—low risk is high use as high risk 
translates to low use. 
Figure 3, below, illustrates the three requirements necessary for the use of 
virtual currency as a viable and common currency.  At the heart of this figure 
is digital currency.  We believe that the three prongs, as outlined above, are 
almost equally important in supporting the sustainability of virtual currencies.  
The first prong is the question of Ownership which is noted in the lower left of 
the figure.  This is a foundation that helps stabilize the value and consumer 
faith in this virtual financial instrument.  Secondly, Regulation is a supporting 
mechanism that helps positively facilitate consumer confidence and providing 
assurances to users and non-users of virtual currencies.  Finally, Dispute 
Settlement is presented at the top of the figure as both supporters are necessary 
to ensure successful and consistent outcomes based on the principals of 
ownership and the ability to regulate the transactions associated with 
ownership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
operations, especially with international transactions, INTERPOL has taken notice and has held conferences 
specifically targeting combating these activities.). 
 148.  Notice 2014-21, supra note 129; HMRC, supra note 130.  The taxation of an asset or income 
derived from that asset is contingent upon the definitions assigned by the governing body. 
 149.  See generally ECB, supra note 72, at 40 (noting our classifications of risk are presented: Credit, 
liquidity, operational, and legal. Credit risk involves the settlement and completion dates as well as the ability 
to meet the obligations associated with the transaction. Liquidity risk addresses a virtual currency’s ability to 
convert into another asset and the speed at which this conversion takes place. Operational risk focuses on the 
entity’s (e.g., bank, money transmitter, or other such facilitating organization) ability to continue forward in 
that role. Finally, legal risk focuses on the impact that regulatory forces and other governmental entities can 
have on virtual currencies structure and classification); see also FinCENa, supra note 5; FinCENb–e, supra 
note 139. 
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Our discussions focused on electronic, digital or virtual currency as 
common tender.
150
  We used academic articles, news clippings, and on-line 
discussions.  These non-academic sources provided critical insight into virtual 
common currency as transactions without a central regulated banking system 
and government oversight is relatively new and subject to rapid market 
changes.  Our intention was to obtain the best available information from the 
source—from individuals associated with virtual currency.
151
  This knowledge 
allow an intellectual discussion on when and if virtual currency will be viable 
and accepted by the federal government, state governments, public 
corporations, private corporations, and individuals in the United States. 
V. VIRTUAL CURRENCY AS A FINANCIAL MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE 
How currency is represented is not the primary issue, but its ability to be 
an instrument of purchasing power, economic mobility, and social mobility.
152
  
Currency, as a financial medium of exchange, must be versatile in facilitating 
transactions or users may seek alternative financial tools that serve their 
purpose.  Some virtual currencies, such as Bitcoins,
153
 have emerged as leading 
alternative financial instruments to traditional transactions. 
Bitcoins were established in 2009
154
 as a decentralized virtual currency 
that has no dominant regulating body.
155
 Unlike many financial transactions, 
transactions with Bitcoins cannot be reversed and may be conducted 
potentially with anonymity.
156
  The maximum supply of Bitcoins is limited to 
 
 150.  See Tavakol, supra note 38, at 1227–28 (explaining the use of virtual currency by governments 
would largely be avoided due to the ability to accurately track the movement of such funds that are outside the 
“banks”). 
 151.  We have identified several individuals that could provide critical insight into virtual currency as 
subject matter experts but declined to interview those individuals.  Considering that virtual currencies could be 
considered a criminal circumvention of legal tender in selected State jurisdictions, we did not wish to subject 
those individuals to any possible legal actions that could arise from these interviews and subsequent 
publication of statements.  However, those articles already published and social media outlets that were 
publically assessable were deemed acceptable as we were not creating any new information. 
 152.  Lawrence P. Shao, Ralph E. McKinney, Jr. & Dale Shao, Purchasing Power of Credit, Social 
Mobility, and Economic Mobility, 12 EUROPEAN J. OF BUS. RES. 73 (2012) [hereinafter Shao] (noting that 
purchasing power includes the individual or organization’s ability to acquire goods and services using cash, 
cash equivalents, credit, reputation, and other lines of credit to facilitate purchases. Economic mobility is the 
access to financial resources such as purchasing power coupled with non-financial resources (i.e., social 
mobility) to obtain a better financial position in life. Social mobility is the ability for an individual to change 
his/her social class through education, career paths, association with groups, and family reputation.). 
 153.  Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN (last visited Aug. 22, 
2013), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. (explaining the philosophical, theoretical, and technological foundation 
for this virtual currency.  In fact, many other virtual currencies are based on similar technology: Cryptology, 
authentication, and the transference of ownership.  Additionally, the name Satoshi Nakamoto is a pen name to 
hide the author or author’s true identities.). 
 154. Digital Currencies: A New Specie: Regulators Should Keep Their Hands Off New Forms of Digital 
Money Such as Bitcoin, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.economist.com/ node/21576104/ 
[hereinafter ECONOMIST, Digital]. 
 155. Virtual Currencies: Mining Digital Gold. Even if it Crashes, Bitcoin May Make a Deal in the 
Financial World, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.economist.com/node/21576149/. [hereinafter 
ECONOMIST, Virtual]. 
 156.  Some Things You Need to Know, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/you-need-to-know (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2013). 
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twenty-one million based upon a unique signature generated for each 
Bitcoin.
157
  While limited,
158
 Bitcoins may be divided into units as small as 
eight decimal points.
159
  Users can obtain Bitcoins either through the creation 
(called mining) of a Bitcoin when complex algorithms are solved by computers 
or from private holders and exchanges of Bitcoins.
160
 
The largest currency conversion exchange is Mt. Gox, where 
approximately 80% of Bitcoin are exchanged.
161
  According to Peck,
162
 a 
limited number of intermediary exchanges can present trading dilemmas for 
any currency.
163
  For Mt. Gox, a major Bitcoin trading problem caused Bitcoin 
values to drastically fall in price by approximately 50%.  Unlike most 
exchanges, Bitcoin transactions can take an average of ten minutes to verify.
164
  
In turn, trading losses could be realized during panic sales
165
 when the supply 
of currency exceeds the demand for currency.
166
  Ultimately, Mt. Gox 
temporary halted “banking” services,
167
 which are reminiscent of the United 
States President Franklin Roosevelt’s declaration of four-day banking holiday 
 
 157. ECONOMIST, Digital, supra note 154. 
 158.  Although Bitcoins are limited, using the maximum whole number of 21,000,000 and dividing this 
into the smaller units, the maximum capacity is 2,100,000,000,000,000 unique coins.  This assumes that all 
divisions are done with numbers and not with alphabets, symbols, and special characters.  Using the American 
alphabet would provide possible permutations of about 2,100,000,000,000,000 to the 26
th
 power.  With the 
symbols and special characters, that number is further increased to almost limitless possibilities assuming these 
are part of the algorithm.  Consequently, 2.1 x 10
15
 has been identified as the maximum amount of Bitcoins. It 
is important to note, Bitcoins are finite in number and as such, are subject to scarcity.  First, the aggregate of 
individuals holding Bitcoins as long-term investments reduces the virtual currency available for use. Unlike 
traditional hard currency supplemented with credit and debt usage purchases enabled by credit cards, virtual 
currency has not developed a mechanism for debt purchases.  Secondly, lost, mislaid, abandoned Bitcoins and 
Bitcoins confiscated by government entities may not be returned to circulation.  Thus, this may further reduce 
the maximum available Bitcoins.  While a mechanism could be created to replace those Bitcoins lost, this 
erodes the ownership rights of individuals having a claim to the virtual currency that is further complicated by 
the anonimity of ownership of said currency.  Hence, Bitcoin may be subject to Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of 
Creative Destruction as scarcity and the inability to replace uncirculating Bitcoins cause a substitution effect 
where users choice alternative virtual currencies. 
 159.  Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq (last visited Aug. 21, 2015). 
 160.  ECONOMIST, Virtual, supra note 155. 
 161.  Bitcoin Panic Selling Halves its Value, BBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
technology-22105322 [hereinafter BBC NEWS, Bitcoin Panic].  Subsequently, Mt. Gox filed for bankruptcy 
protection and has since become defunct as an exchange.  In Re Mt. Gox Co. No. 14-31229 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 
Mar. 9, 2014). 
 162.  Morgen Peck, 3 Years in, Bitcoin Digital Money Gains Momentum, SCI. AM. (Oct. 8, 2012), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=3-years-in-Bitcoin-digital-money-gains-momentum 
[hereinafter Peck]. 
 163.  With all financial exchanges, there are always possibilities that trading dilemmas exist.  However, 
with a monopoly or very few exchanges available the general public, these dilemmas are significantly 
amplified. In addition to the non-competitive nature of the exchanges for virtual currency, traders are subject 
to the opening and closing of the exchange.  Moreover, virtual currency is subject to technological barriers—if 
technology is insufficient, the ability to trade is non-existent or severely limited.  Furthermore, the exchange 
must have access to the virtual currency in order to satisfy consumer demand. 
 164.  BITCOIN, supra note 159. 
 165.  BBC NEWS, Bitcoin Panic, supra note 161. 
 166.  As indicated earlier, an exchange’s access to virtual currency is a critical aspect of meeting 
consumer demand.  In this example, the inability to meet demand created an exceptionally large trading gap 
where the value of the virtual currency as a whole was impacted.  If there were alternative exchanges where 
traders would be able to obtain virtual currencies, then the impact to the value of said currency may be 
minimized provided that any alternative exchanges could meet consumer expectations. 
 167.  BBC NEWS, Bitcoin Panic, supra note 161. 
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in 1933.
168
  Even if Bitcoin can stabilize its value, the speed of transactions 
needs to increase dramatically for it to be a viable form of virtual payments.
169
  
A virtual currency must have a broad trading base to operate to be an effective 
medium of exchange.
170
  In addition to limited intermediary exchanges, 
Peck
171
 and BBC
172
 note that limited vendor acceptance and the increased 
number of virtual thefts of Bitcoins have caused conceptual changes (i.e., 
increased security and cryptology) to Bitcoin. 
Because virtual currencies can support anonymity, illicit transactions can 
more easily be conducted using virtual currency.
173
  The United States 
Department of Justice indicted
174
 E-Gold Ltd, Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc., and 
three owners for performing as an alternative payment system that aids in 
facilitating money-laundering activities.
175
  Subsequently, those charged plead 
guilty.
176
 Furthermore, the Department of Justice
177
 notes that “new electronic 
currency systems increases the risk that criminal, and possibly terrorists, will 
exploit these systems to launder money and transfer funds globally to avoid 
law enforcement scrutiny and circumvent banking regulations and 
reporting.”
178
  Thus, any virtual currency must consider the jurisdictional 
 
 168.  Exec. Order 6102, 31 C.F.R. 120.2 (1933) [Proclamation 2039—Declaring Bank Holiday] led to a 
chain of policies through a combination of Congressional Legislative Actions (see Emergency Banking Act of 
1933, Public Law 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 for the formation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation “FDIC”) 
and Executive Actions (Proclamation 2040—Bank Holiday).  While there is a distinction between “hard” and 
“virtual” currencies, the 1933 actions resulted from significant problems associated with the access to 
property, that is gold coin and legal tender, which ultimately resulted in the unprecedented demand by 
customers of the return of deposits from banks and other financial institutions.  Eighty years later in 2013, a 
similar demand on “financial institutions” concerning Bitcoins was made.  It should be noted that holders of 
Bitcoins are subject to losses without any backing of insurances such as FDIC. 
 169.  See generally Schreft, supra note 114 (discussing payment methods and practical considerations for 
different media of exchange).  Virtual payments will need to mimic remote purchases and “real currency” to 
be widely accepted and used. Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Peck, supra note 162. 
 172.  Bitcoin Theft Causes Bitfloor Exchange to Go Offline, BBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2012),  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19486695 [hereinafter BBC NEWS, Bitcoin Theft]. 
 173.  BITCOIN, supra note 159; Peck, supra note 162. 
 174.  U.S. Dep’t of Just., Digital Currency Business E-Gold Indicted for Money Laundering and Illegal 
Money Transmitting, US DoJ Publication No. 07-301 (April 27, 2007) [hereinafter Dep’t of Justice]. 
 175.  Id. According to the release, “one count of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, one count 
of conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business, one count of operating an unlicensed 
money transmitting business under federal law and one count of money transmission without a license under 
D.C. law.” 
 176.  United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 82 (2008). This case focused on a “digital currency” 
that was the primary financial medium of exchange in an unlicensed “money transmitting business” (see 18 
U.S.C. § 1960 (prohibiting unlicensed money transmitting businesses)).  Moreover, this case identifies that the 
conversion of digital currency to another currency, domestic or foreign, is enough to be considered a money 
transmitting business; 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (detailing that when United States coins or currency is involved in 
financial transfers by a domestic financial institution, then that institution must report such as advised by the 
Secretary of the Treasury (31 U.S.C. § 5313(a))); see also Press Release, Secret Serv., In U.S. Secret Service-
Led Investigation, Digital Currency Business E-Gold Pleads Guilty To Money Laundering and Illegal Money 
Transmitting Charges, GPA 14-08, U.S. Secret Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (July 22, 2008), 
http://www.secretservice.gov/press/GPA14-08EGold.pdf (noting E-Gold’s guilty plea for multiple charges) 
[hereinafter Secret Serv.].; see also, Judson, supra note 75, at 9 (stating “The United States Secret Service 
(USSS) is responsible for investigating, prosecuting, and preventing counterfeiting activity.”). 
 177.  Secret Serv., supra note 176. 
 178.  Dep’t of Just., supra note 174. 
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limitations imposed by government regulators
179
 such as FinCEN
180
 especially 
when transmitting claims to assets
181
 which may extend to being held as an 
investment or asset.
182
 
The table below
183
 presents ten virtual currencies and how those 
currencies represent the three requirements necessary for a successful virtual 
currency. 
 
VIRTUAL CURRENCY Property 
Dispute 
Resolution Regulation 
Bitcoin Yes No Limited 
Litecoin Yes No Limited 
Peercoin Yes No Limited 
Namecoin Yes No Limited 
Feathercoin Yes No Limited 
Megacoin Yes No Limited 
Novacoin Yes* No Limited 
BitShares BPS  
(Formerly ProtoShares) Yes* No Limited 
QuarkCoin Yes* No Limited 
WorldCoin Yes* No Limited 
 
 
 
 179.  This becomes more difficult in determining jurisdictional limitations when dealing with foreign 
governments and financial instruments without a true basis such as virtual currency.  In Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010), the Court determined that there are limitations of law with respect to 
foreign claims and assertions; and that when those limitations are met that a certain standard of proof must be 
presented before any action can be taken. 
 180.  Jennifer Shasky Calvery, The Virtual Economy: Potential, Perplexities and Promises, REMARKS OF 
JENNIFER SHASKY CALVERY DIR. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (June 13, 2013). FinCEN answers to 
the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. 
 181.  Id. at 4. (“[K]eep in mind the combined actions by the Department of Justice and FinCEN took 
down a $6 billion money laundering operation, the biggest in U.S. history.”).  Moreover, as virtual currencies 
are convertible to a currency, the central traders of such may be deemed an “alternative trading system” under 
7 U.S.C. § 1(a).  Essentially, anyone acting as a broker or facilitator for such exchanges may be subject to 
additional such regulators pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  Thus, virtual currencies are 
similar to “stock” regulations, but in some instances, virtual currencies may be considered more fluid and 
comparable to common tender. 
 182.  U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. States, 674 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2009).  In this 
case, relief was granted to the plaintiffs on the basis that the allegations of illegal trading practices under the 
Commodity Exchange Act were true.  Specifically, participants must have had access to a digital currency 
account (either INT Gold or e-Gold) to conduct business with Infinity.  Furthermore, Notice 2014-21, supra 
note 129, classifies virtual currencies similarly to stock and bonds. Collectively, FinCEN, supra notes 5, 139, 
180, treats virtual currencies as being subject to regulation as instruments of money transmission. 
 183.  See Reuven Cohen, The Top 30 Crypto-Currency Market Capitalizations in One Place, FORBES 
(Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/reuvencohen/2013/11/27/the-top-30-crypto-currency-market-
capitalizations-in-one-place/ (showing the top ten virtual currencies and applying the three requirements that 
we believe that virtual currencies need to be successful). 
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Considering the recent property classifications of virtual currency, each 
one fits this classification.  Consequently, the lower four have been marked as 
it was difficult to identify critical information from the primary entity’s 
website concerning what constitutes virtual currency.  Therefore, the 
classification of Novacoin, BitShares BPS, QuarkCoin, and WorldCoin is 
largely contingent upon secondary characteristics of regulation.  It is this 
regulation, to some extent, that drives the recognition of property.  
Furthermore, we restricted this evaluation to consider its implications in only 
the U.S. 
After a comprehensive review of each virtual currency, the requirement 
for dispute resolution has not been satisfied for any virtual currency.  In fact, 
only Bitcoin provided some information concerning the legality and risks 
associated with ownership and usage of that virtual currency.
184
  For dispute 
resolution, self-regulation is considered, at least partially, to provide some 
level at which an individual can have a grievance or an appeal for assistance 
heard.  Again, no virtual currency we investigated had this mechanism.  We 
believe that as transactions in virtual currencies increase, the recognition of 
virtual currencies as properties, and as regulations increase, dispute resolution 
will also emerge.  This supports Figure 3 as both ownership and regulation are 
supporters of virtual currencies that provide a foundation for dispute 
resolution. 
Regulation for each is limited.  Overall, the U.S. has the general power to 
regulate virtual currencies.
185
  However, this regulation mostly affects the users 
and transmitters of virtual currency. Alternatively, some States have the ability 
to regulate virtual currency, contingent upon how that currency is defined in 
terms of property.
186
  This may not be with all virtual currencies.  As the 
currencies above are the top ten traded virtual currencies,
187
 regulation is 
assured under the concept of money transmissions.
188
  It should be noted that 
similar to other currencies and investments, virtual currency prices may 
fluctuate and that these ranking were based on previous market conditions; and 
as such, may no longer be the case today. With less sought after virtual 
currencies, this may not be the case.  Regulation is mostly assured considering 
the popularity is increasing for virtual currencies.
189
 
Although the popularity of virtual currency including Bitcoin has 
increased
190
 primarily through social media,
191
 some advocate against using a 
 
 184.  Legal Disclaimer, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/legal (last visited Aug. 22, 2015) [hereinafter 
Bitcoin Legal]. 
 185.  FinCENa, supra note 5. 
 186.  See GAO-14-496 supra note 134 (explaining that this article assumes that virtual currency fits the 
definition of intangible person al property). 
 187.  Cohen, supra note 183. 
 188.  See supra notes 5, 139 (collectively finding virtual currencies to be subject to regulation as 
instruments of money transmission). 
 189.  See Economist, Digital, supra note 154 at 1–2 (“[M]ore and more people and businesses are 
prepared to accept Bitcoins as a way to make and receive payments.”). 
 190.  Bitcoin Under Pressure, ECONOMIST (Nov. 30, 2013). 
 191.  Economist, Digital, supra note 154. 
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virtual currency.
192
  Angel
193
 suggests that as virtual currencies are created 
without a legitimate basis, a virtual currency most likely would be used for 
criminal activities such as a fraud associated with a Ponzi
194
 scheme.
195
  This is 
primarily due to the fact that a virtual currency is not tangible and easily 
convertible or transferable to other parties.
196
 
Nonetheless, a virtual bank establish in France provides the same 
protection of virtual assets as traditional financial institutions offer for 
currently common and accepted currency.
197
  In essence, the virtual currency 
movement is making progress towards a common currency becoming 
legitimate.  Furthermore, with the value of virtual currency increasing and its 
utility of being used to facilitate transactions and to conduct business 
operations, it will be a target of counterfeiting. 
VI. COUNTERFEITING 
Coins and notes have been around in various forms for thousands of years 
and so too has counterfeiting currency.
198
  Counterfeiting may also be 
described as the replication or manufacture of a financial instrument (e.g., 
currency, stamps, bank notes, scrip, and tokens) with the intent to defraud an 
individual, entity, or government.  However, there are similar definitions 
without the intent to defraud.
199
  We believe that the intent is critical to the 
 
 192.  Id. at 2. 
 193.  James J. Angel, Don’t get Bitten by Bitcoins, CNN (Apr. 12, 2013) http://www.cnn.com/ 
2013/04/11/opinion/angel-bitcoin-currency. 
 194.  Marc Artzrouni, The Mathematics of Ponzi Schemes, 14420 MUNICH PERSONAL REPEC ARCHIVE 
(Apr. 2, 2009), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14420/1/MPRA_paper_14420.pdf.  Ponzi Schemes were 
named for Charles Ponzi who, in the 1920s, conned investors into allowing him to manage their investments 
for a promise of very high returns. Subsequent investors’ funds were erroneously provided to previous 
investors to satisfy their expectations and support this ruse. However, at some point, Ponzi could no longer 
support the high returns as additional investors could not offset previous promises to prior investors; see also 
Ponzi Scheme, SEC, http://sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2015) (discussing the Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s investigations of Ponzi Schemes). 
 195.  James O’Toole, Bitconned: SEC Busts Alleged Bitcoin Ponzi Scheme, CNN MONEY (July 23, 
2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/23/investing/bitcoin-ponzi-scheme/ (stating that the SEC has the power 
to regulate all financial instruments including digital investments). 
 196.  SEC v. Prater, No. Civ.A. 303CV1524MRK, 2005 WL 2585269, at *1 (D. Conn. Aug. 24, 2005). 
In this case, fictitious accounts (i.e., SpingPay) were created by users where the fraudsters accounted for funds 
but failed to attach any “real” currency to those accounts. This was the basis of the Pyramid Scheme, to 
account for the funds only on the surface. 
 197.  See Virtual Cash Exchange Becomes Bank, BBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2012),  http://www.bbc.co.uknews/ 
technology-20641465 [hereinafter BBC News, Virtual Cash] (discussing how Bitcoin-Central was created 
after collaborating with Aqoba and Credit Mutuel). 
 198.  Levenson, supra note 32; see also Zs. Kasztovszky, ET AL. Comparative Archaeometrical Study of 
Roman Silver Coins by Prompt Gamma Activation Analysis and SEM-EDX, 265 J. OF RADIOANALYTICAL & 
NUCLEAR CHEMISTRY 193, at 198 (2005) (showing instances of denarii coins issued under Roman rule in the 
2
nd
 century C.E. which have been discovered as forgeries). 
 199.  CHRISTINE AMMER & DEAN S. AMMER, DICTIONARY OF BUS. & ECON.: REVISED AND EXPANDED 
EDITION 111 (The Free Press: NY, 1984) [hereinafter Ammer] (A “counterfeit [is defined as] . . . [d]escribing a 
false coin or currency made in imitation of a lawful one.  Also, to make such an imitation.  The word originally 
meant to press a soft mold against something, and therefore refers to items that are engraved, as coins and 
paper money are.”); see also Barnard, supra note 53, at 601 (“The line of demarcation, for example, between 
the issuing of tokens and counterfeiting is by no means always clear.  The difficulty is all the more evident 
when it is remembered that tokens frequently resemble the authorized money of the country, and that 
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definition of counterfeiting.
200
  Furthermore, the primary motive behind 
counterfeiting is to increase one’s financial position either through the use of 
fraudulent currencies in the acquisition of goods and services
201
 or by the 
destabilization of a currency in the case of war.
202
 
In highly volatile economic and political conditions, dollars can 
virtually drive out other assets including domestic currency.  
Moreover, once people lose faith in their local currency, they tend to 
hold dollars for a long time before the local currency is able to 
regain credibility.
203
 
In January 1776, the British used counterfeiting to flood the colonies that 
later comprised the United States with fake currency that resulted in the 
replacement of $40 million worth of currency.
204
  Ultimately, the United States 
currency became worthless by 1781 due to these British counterfeiting 
tactics.
205
  These tactics may be attributed to Dr. Benjamin Church and John 
Fleming as their attempt to counterfeit colonial currency in an effort to 
extinguish debts and maintain their current economic status.
206
  This was not 
the only instance of financial warfare in the colonies nor is it the only one 
globally.
207
 
Another example of wartime counterfeiting commenced on September 
18, 1939.
208
  Operation Bernhard
209
 was a secret German operation aimed at 
producing counterfeit British currency.
210
  Using captured prisoners, 
approximately £132 million was produced by 1945.
211
  The amount of 
counterfeit currency represented approximately 15% of what was actually 
circulating.
212
  But this plan never fully succeeded.
213
 
 
counterfeits are not always exactly like the money they seek to imitate.  The legal prohibitions of 
counterfeiting are the most satisfactory criteria for distinguishing between what is counterfeit and what is 
token.  In the United States, at any rate, the law has been very specific in defining what constitutes 
counterfeiting.”). 
 200.  The intent to commit fraud becomes a critical concept in penal codes, statues, and criminal 
prosecution.  This is illustrated in Table 1 of Part IX when considering the various State statutes concerning 
counterfeiting—intent is a part of each. 
 201.  Levenson, supra note 35.  Eric P. Newman, The Successful British Counterfeiting of American 
Paper Money During the American Revolution, 29 BRIT. NUMISMATIC J. 174 (1958).  [hereinafter Newman].  
“[C]ounterfeiting for personal gain has a record as old as currency itself  . . . .”).  
 202.  Ultimately, the goal of counterfeiting in times of war is to increase the economic power of one 
nation by degrading another nation’s currency.  This is most effectively done when the users of said currency 
lose faith in its value; and thereby those users seek alternative forms of conducting transactions.  This may be 
the increased use of precious metals, bartering, and the use of substitutive forms of payments including other 
currencies. 
 203.  Judson, supra note 75, at 6.  Furthermore, the use of dollars as a valued currency can easily be 
replaced by another strong currency.  The primary point is that the currency perceived as having the ability to 
hold its value over an extended time will prevail.  Thus, the concept is risk minimization. 
 204.  Levenson, supra note 32, at 31.  Newman, supra note 201, at 174 states “Counterfeiting is now 
planned and guarded against as an important element in the strategy of modern warfare.” 
 205.  Newman, supra note 201, at 174. 
 206.  Id. at 179. 
 207.  Newman, supra note 201, at 174. 
 208.  Michael E. Telzrow, Nazi Counterfeiters, THE NEW AM., Aug. 18, 2008, at 33. 
 209.  Id. at 33 (noting that the operation was named after Bernhard Krueger). 
 210.  Id. at 34. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
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Today, it is estimated that approximately $60 to $80 million in counterfeit 
United States currency is circulating.
214
  This translates to a value that is less 
than $1 in counterfeit funds per $10,000 in actual currency.
215
  According to 
Svoboda, a closer estimate is more than $70 million in counterfeit currency is 
always in circulation.
216
  Without countermeasures to counterfeiting, the 
roughly $60 to $80 million could be significantly higher. 
VII. COUNTERFEITING COUNTERMEASURES FOR COINS, NOTES AND VIRTUAL 
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
As presented in the previous Part, counterfeiting can significantly and 
detrimentally erode the financial foundation and the underpinnings of national 
economic systems.
217
  In some cases, this erosion can further impact global 
markets.
218
  Thus, it is in the national interest to entrench countermeasures to 
counterfeiting to deter and minimize any impact that fraudulent schemes have 
upon an economy.
219
  To better illustrate the dynamics of counterfeiting and 
counterfeit countermeasures, the figure below is presented.  
 
 213.  Id. The prisoners would periodically reduce work output as they understood that when the operation 
was completed, they were to be executed.  Additionally, the British government stopped allowing any currency 
from entering into the country. Id. at 35. 
 214.  Judson, supra note 75, at 13.  However, some extrapolation can place the aggregate amount of 
counterfeit currency in circulation between $120 to $220 million. Id. at 32.  But, the most plausible amount 
would be the $60 to $80 million. Id. 
 215.  Id. at 13. 
 216.  Elizabeth Svoboda, Building Better Money, POPULAR SCI. (Feb. 2008), at 52 (2008). 
 217.  Judson, supra note 75, at 6; Ciro Grandi, The Protection of the Euro Against Counterfeiting, 12 
EUROPEAN J. OF CRIME, CRIM. LAW, & JUST. 89 (2004) [hereinafter Grandi].  It is in the best interest of 
Governments to punish foreign currency counterfeiting within their own jurisdictions as failures to deter these 
actions could give rise to a failure of enforcement (essentially the granting of immunity) to a perpetrator. Id. at 
99.  Furthermore, “[c]ounterfeiting primarily harms the monetary sovereignty of the States and the 
development of economic relationships, which are based on the common confidence about the authenticity of 
money.” Id. at 98. 
 218.  Evan F. Kohlman & Rodrigo Bijou, Planning Reponses and Defining Attacks in Cyberspace, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 173, 173 (2013) (noting that attacks in Cyberspace do target financial systems as a means to 
wage economic warfare and to conduct terrorist activities). 
 219.  Id. “A lack of established international legal procedures, a hazy public understanding of the 
mechanics of electronic intrusions, and cyberterrorists’ exponentially faster operational tempo (all combined 
with the extreme challenges involved in definitively identifying perpetrators on the Internet) have allowed 
some lawless actors to operate with a surprising sense of impunity.”  In fact, there need to be clear benchmarks 
of law establishing protocols and operations surrounding property rights and the triggering factors in which 
these protocols can take place.  Id. at 174.  Moreover, we must “uphold law and order across the digital 
domain.”  Id. at 175.  This would extend to the counterfeiting of virtual currencies as well as financial 
disruptions of any legitimate financial transaction. 
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A large part of this counterfeit currency can be traced to the technology of 
virtual scanners and printers.  Countermeasures against the counterfeiting of 
“traditional” currency are presented below. 
 
COUNTERFEITING COUNTERMEASURES FOR COINS & NOTES
220
 
 
 Micro-Microprinting–extremely small print that is difficult, though 
not impossible to scan and print.
221
 
 Security Threads–embedded threads with words printed on them in a 
very small font.
222
 
 Watermarks.
223
 
 Tricky Images–using scanners and photo software to create extremely 
accurate details.
224
 
 Color Changing Ink – ink changes color as the currency is moved.
225
 
 Enlarged off-center portraits.
226
 
 Changes in the design of currency.
227
 
 Special high-grade paper.
228
 
 Coins are easier to counterfeit, but their smaller value results in less 
counterfeiting.
229
  Similarly, lower value paper currency counterfeiting 
 
 220.  Judson, supra note 78, at 11. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Mariana R. de Almeida, et al., Discrimination Between Authentic and Counterfeit Banknotes Using 
Raman Spectroscopy and PLS-DA with Uncertainty Estimation, 109 MICROCHEMICAL J. 170, 173 (2013) 
[hereinafter Almeida].  In addition to color changing ink, the use of a portable device using Raman 
Spectroscopy may provide forensic methods able to distinguish between authentic and counterfeit notes. 
 226.  Williams & Anderson, supra note 15, at 374. 
 227.  Yvan Lengwiler, A Model of Money Counterfeits, 65 J. OF ECON. 123, 123–24 (1997). 
 228.  Judson, supra note 75, at 17. Moreover, this high-grade paper has a distinct texture or feel to it that 
helps readily identify authentic currency. 
 229.  Svoboda, supra note 216. 
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is infrequent as well.
230
 
 
While counterfeiting coin and paper financial instruments and also their 
countermeasures, virtual currency has appeared relatively recently and the 
methods used to discourage their counterfeiting are also recent 
developments.
231
  Virtual currency can take the form of digital cash, e-tokens, 
e-vouchers, all representing forms that may be used to pay bills in an electronic 
form instead of a hard money form, such as paper currency and coins.
232
  
Recently, versions of virtual currency have caused financial entities such as the 
European Central Bank to take notice.
233
  Bitcoin has garnered the most 
attention, as it grew from a value of a few dollars to $266 and recently traded 
at around $140, all within a relatively short period of time.
234
  Bitcoin uses a 
peer-to-peer platform that uses a purchaser’s computer to create an anonymous 
virtual currency that uses cryptographic technology to achieve a secure, and 
anonymous, form of payment.
235
 
Privacy advocates and libertarians are particularly fond of the anonymity 
of Bitcoin based transactions.
236
  A current downside for countries is that the 
anonymity of currency such as Bitcoin prevents governments from collecting 
taxes.
237
  In 2011, China decided not to allow any real world items to be 
purchased with virtual currencies.
238
  Another weakness of virtual currency is 
the fact that, though the system on which Bitcoin exists is a relatively secure 
one,
239
 Bitcoin exchanges that rely on servers, firms offering storage of 
Bitcoins, and the computers of individuals with Bitcoin accounts, are not as 
secure as they need to be and have resulted in large losses.
240
 These technology 
related problems are being worked on and mostly solved, but there is still large 
room for improvement.
241
  Countermeasures against the counterfeiting of 
 
 230.  Id. at 130–31; see also Judson, supra note 75, at 17–18. The $1 and $2 denominations of U.S. 
currency do not have the security features. This is primarily as the cost in materials to produce counterfeit 
notes of these denominations would far exceed any benefits or financial gains to the producer. 
 231.  Scott Aaronson et al., Quantum Money, 55 COMM. OF THE ACM 84 (Aug. 2012); see also Tristan 
Gorrindo & James E. Groves, Crime and Hate in Virtual Worlds: A New Playground for the Id?, 18 HARV. 
REV. PSYCHIATRY 113–14 (2010) [hereinafter Gorrindo] (“Transgressive, addictive, and even criminal 
behaviors in the real world have their virtual analogs in virtual worlds-including gambling, adultery, fraud, 
vandalism, prostitution, bigamy, hate speech, and selling of illicit substances, to name a few.”).  Considering 
these criminal behaviors, we can logically conclude that counterfeiting virtual currency would also be included 
in such a profile for virtual world crimes. 
 232.  See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL AML/CFT 
RISKS 4 (2014) (defining virtual currency). 
 233.  Jacob Aron, Virtual Economy Looms as Digital Cash Grows Up, 216 NEW SCIENTIST 22, 24 (2012) 
[hereinafter Aron] 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Alex Hern, Digital Boom and Bust, 142 NEW STATESMAN 21, 21 (2013). 
 236.  See Primavera De Filippi, Bitcoin: A Regulatory Nightmare to a Libertarian Dream, INTERNET 
POL’Y REV. (May 2014), at 8 (describing the anonymity of Bitcoins). 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Sydney Ember, Data Security is Becoming the Sparkle in Bitcoin, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/business/dealbook/data-security-is-becoming-the-sparkle-in-bitcoin.html. 
 240.  Aron, supra note 233, at 90–92. 
 241.  Gerry Smith, How Hackers Could Burst the Bitcoin Bubble, HUFFINGTON POST, (Apr. 11, 2013, 
1:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/11/hackers-bitcoin_n_3052648.html [hereinafter Smith, 
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virtual currency are presented below. 
 
SAMPLE COUNTERFEITING COUNTERMEASURES FOR  
VIRTUAL CURRENCY
242
 
 
 Improved security against hackers.
243
 
 Cryptographic capabilities are built in to the non-centralized 
transaction processing software.
244
 
 Virtual wallet apps that allow a person to carry virtual cash in their 
smartphones use passwords and encryption to protect the individual 
user again theft of their virtual wallet’s content.
245
 
 Recent improvements in virtual wallets carried on smartphones allow 
the owner to erase the smartphone’s memory remotely, if their wallet 
is stolen.
246
 
Virtual currency has its problems, and is still evolving, but will be a 
significant part of our financial futures.
247
  In Part VIII, we present a brief 
overview of the regulation of currency by a government. 
VIII.  A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT  
REGULATION OF CURRENCY 
Governments generally regulate and police currency
248
 and therefore they 
legitimize its value as currency by protecting the public’s interest.
249
  However, 
there are some
250
 that make the argument that the counterfeiting of illegitimate 
 
Hackers]. 
 242.  Shweta Srivastava & Vandana Saraswat, E-cash Payments Protocols, 4 INT’L J. ON COMPUTER 
ENG’G 1603, 1607 (2012) [hereinafter Srivastava]. 
 243.  Gladstone, supra note 125, at 1203 (noting, “‘Spawning,’ the process whereby multiple claims for 
payment are created by a single authentic claim, may result from an innocent technical error or as a result of 
fraud.”).  It is a known fact that hackers will take advantage of vulnerabilities and “spawning” represents a risk 
exposure associated with the trustworthiness to any virtual currency.  “Double payment results because the 
issuer is unable to distinguish an authenticate claim from a counterfeit one.”; Dino Grandoni, Hackers Exploit 
‘Flash’ Vulnerability in Yahoo Ads, N.Y. TIMES, (last visited Aug. 3, 2015, 9:14 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/ 2015/08/03/hackers-exploit-flash-vulnerability-in-yahoo-ads/. 
 244.  See also, Srivastava, supra note 242. This would include the authentication and signature 
techniques associated with each and every transaction, to ensure that accurate payment protocols are carried 
out; see also Boris Škorić and Marc X. Makkes, Flowchart Description of Security Primitives for Controlled 
Physical Unclonable Functions, 9 INT’L J. OF INFO. SEC. 327, 327–28 (2010).  These cryptographic capabilities 
would also include Physical Unclonable Functions (“PUFs”) which may be used to authenticate a virtual 
transaction. 
 245.  Brian X. Chen, The Campaign to Digitize Your Wallet is Intensifying, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/technology/the-campaign-to-digitize-your-wallet-is-intensifying.html. 
 246.  Srivastava, supra note 242. 
 247.  Rosemary Westwood, The Cold, Hard Cash of the Internet, 126 MACLEAN 24, 24 (2013). 
 248.  Judson, supra note 75, at 10.  (“In some countries, counterfeiting of foreign currency is not illegal 
. . . .”). This is an important aspect considering the sovereign rights of other nations and is well beyond the 
scope of this essay. 
 249.  See Tavakol, supra note 38, at 1219 (noting payments for goods and services by a government tend 
to be made by their respective legal tender). 
 250.  See generally Walter E. Block, In Defense of Counterfeiting Illegitimate Money: Rejoinder to 
Murphy and Machaj, 69 AM. J. OF ECON. & SOC. 867, 867 (2010) (emphasizing digital currency 
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currencies,
251
 by the virtue that they are not sanctioned by a government,
252
 do 
not constitute and should not constitute criminal activity or criminal charges.  
Nevertheless, “A policy that deters counterfeiting is needed to maintain the 
public’s confidence in money.”
253
  So much so, that the League of Nations 
established on April 20, 1929 a ‘national framework’ to protect against 
counterfeiting currency—any issuance of legal tender by a government—by 
criminalizing its practice and prosecuting those individuals that engage in such 
activities.
254
 
In the United States, the integrity of the money is Constitutionally 
protected, with a mandate to Congress to regulate laws against 
counterfeiting.
255
  Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 6 gives Congress the authority, “To 
provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of 
the United States.”
256
 
Although the punishment of counterfeiting the “securities and current 
coin” of the United States didn’t specifically include currency or paper 
money—or the presently used Federal Reserve Notes—the courts have long 
construed that counterfeiting official United States paper money, or 
“currency,” is a violation of federal law.
257
  Title 18 U.S.C. § 473 provides: 
 
counterfeiting is illegitimate). 
 251.  James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and the Evaluation of Judicial 
Precedent, 54 LA L. REV. 1, 1 (1993) (noting it may be argued that the counterfeiting statues are not applicable 
to paper money, but only to coins as these coins were the currency whereas the paper money was only 
representations of the coins.); Mateusz Machaj, Against Both Private and Public Counterfeiting, 66 AM. J. OF 
ECON. & SOC. 977, 978 (2007) (“First, fiat money is an illegitimate property title to gold and silver, which was 
stolen from the public.  Second, fiat money is illegitimate because its monetary existence is conditioned by the 
threat of force (competition in the money sphere is forbidden).”).  We are not addressing the legality of the 
United States currency but merely highlighting some defenses and arguments that an alleged counterfeiter may 
assert.  Moreover, the constitutionality and legality of United States currency is a separate issue, although 
related, to counterfeiting.   This concept is also addressed in Part X when we address avenues for future 
research. 
 252.  See Thayer, supra note 21, at 75–76 (discussing one of the earliest published law review debates 
concerning United States Legal Tender.  “Can Congress emit bills and make them a legal tender?  In 
considering the action of the Convention which framed the Constitution it is interesting to observe that this 
question presented itself, for the most part, not as a twofold question, but as a single one.  The matter discussed 
was the emission of bills.  Whatever this might mean, this was the dangerous thing. This was the power which 
it was proposed, in terms, to give, and this only; and this only is what was stricken out. If it should turn out that 
the power of emitting bills was not gone, by merely striking out the grant, then, of course, that act is not 
conclusive upon the question of giving them the legal tender quality.  This power of making paper a legal 
tender may, indeed, be wanting for other reasons, but it is not wanting by reason merely of striking out the 
expression of a power to emit bills.”). 
 253.  Ben Fung & Enchuan Shao, Modeling the Counterfeiting of Bank Notes: A Literature Review, 2011 
BANK OF CAN. REV. 29, 34 (2011); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover 
Police Participation in Crime, 63 STAN. L. REV. 155, 156 (2009).  It should be noted that law enforcement 
officers have participated in counterfeiting bills as a method to apprehend individuals that may engage in 
criminal activities.  The two examples are United States v. Gonzales, 539 F.2d 1238, 1239 (9th Cir. 1976) and 
United States v. Reifsleck, 535 F.2d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 254.  Protocol to the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, 112 
L.N.T.S. 371 (Apr. 20, 1929); Grandi, supra note 217, at 89. Although this agreement was signed by the 
United States, it has not yet been ratified.  Moreover, this agreement authorizes and permits the member states 
of the European Union to have authority to deal directly with issues involving counterfeiting. 
 255.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6. 
 256.  United States v. Grismore, 546 F.2d 844, 847 (10th Cir. 1976) (“A person of reasonable intelligence 
is certainly aware that it is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472 to counterfeit a federal reserve note.”). 
 257.  18 U.S.C. § 473 (2012). 
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Whoever buys, sells, exchanges, transfers, receives, or delivers any 
false, forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation or other security of 
the United States, with the intent that the same be passed, published, 
or used as true and genuine, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
258
 
The word “obligation” in the statute as well as in Title 18 U.S.C. § 472, 
refers to counterfeit Federal Reserve notes.
259
  In fact, this is specifically 
codified at Title 18 U.S.C. § 8, wherein “obligations of the United States” are 
defined.
260
 
The powers that States have in regulating legal tender with respect to 
federal currency, bank notes, and foreign (non-U.S.) currency must be 
considered.
261
  Using this information, we consider if States can regulate 
virtual currency as a common tender.
262
  Therefore, we reviewed each State’s 
statutes using the legal research program WestlawNext. As the terms 
counterfeiting and forgery with regards to currency
263
 are normally 
synonymous, the search of State statutes primarily used those terms, among 
others, to identify a State’s respective criminal and penal codes to consider 
questions of currency regulation. 
IX. ANALYSIS OF THE STATES’ REGULATORY POWERS OVER CURRENCY 
In this section, we consider each State’s regulatory power over 
currency.
264
  To depict this analysis, the table below presents each State’s 
regulatory powers, by Code Citation, with respect to United States Currency, 
Bank Notes, Non-U.S. Currency and virtual currencies.  Moreover, it is 
organized alphabetically by State with the addition of the date of entrance into 
the union and the date of the last code revision.  These dates are important 
when assessing whether or not the code would need updating and also may 
provide some historic insight into the severity of the punishments for 
 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  United States. v. Grismore, 546 F.2d at 847 (1976). 
 260.  18 U.S.C. § 8 (2012). The term “obligation or other security of the United States” includes all 
bonds, certificates of indebtedness, national bank currency, Federal Reserve notes, Federal Reserve bank 
notes, coupons, United States notes, Treasury notes, gold certificates, silver certificates, fractional notes, 
certificates of deposit, bills, checks, or drafts for money, drawn by or upon authorized officers of the United 
States, stamps and other representatives of value, of whatever denomination, issued under any Act of 
Congress, and canceled United States stamps. 
 261.  Tavakol, supra note 38, at 1210. The question of sovereignty and its definitions needs to be fully 
examined in order to consider if a government can effectively regulate currency in general. This brings a 
critical question: In the U.S., do States have rights as sovereign governments to regulate counterfeiting as 
applied to U.S. legal tender, or does the Federal government have exclusive rights? 
 262.  Id. at 1211. Virtual currencies could erode State sovereignty by the lack of a physical presence 
within the State’s jurisdiction. 
 263.  The various terms such as counterfeiting and forgery that were used to identify laws pertaining to 
currency were traced to their source and corresponding code sections to ensure that their meanings were 
related to currencies.  In fact, initial results primarily indicated that counterfeiting and forgery laws were 
limited to merchandise, pharmaceuticals, and synthetic illegal substances. 
 264.  In fact, a comparative analysis may be made among the States of the United States of America and 
the member states of the European Union considering that both have a centralized doctrine and directives 
against counterfeiting. 
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counterfeiting. 
 
Table 1: The States’ Authority to Regulate Counterfeiting Currencies 
 
STATE 
Date 
Entered 
Union 
Date of 
Last 
Code 
Revision 
State Code 
Citation 
U.S. 
Currency 
Bank 
Note 
Non-U.S. 
Currency 
Virtual 
Currency 
 
Alabama 1819 1977 ALA 13A-9-2 Yes Yes Yes No 
Alaska 1959 1978 AS11.46.500 Yes Yes Yes No 
Arizona 1912 2011 ARS 13-2002 Yes Yes Yes No 
Arkansas 1836 1975 A.C.A. 5-37-201 Yes Yes Yes No 
California 1850 1998 Cal Penal 476 Yes Yes No No 
Colorado 1876 2003 C.R.S.A. 
18-5-102 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Connecticut 1788 1969 CG.S.A.53a-138 Yes Yes Yes No 
Delaware 1787 1995 11 Del.C. 861 Yes Yes Yes No 
D.C.  
(non-State) 
N/A 1982 NOT 
APPLICABLE 
No No No No 
Florida 1845 2001 F.S.A. 831.28 Yes Yes Yes No* 
Georgia 1788 2012 Ga. Code Ann. 
16-9-1 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Hawaii 1959 1997 H.R.S. 708-851 Yes Yes Yes No 
Idaho 1890 2004 I.C. 18-3601 Yes Yes No No 
Illinois 1818 2013 720 I.L.C.S. 
5/17-3 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indiana 1816 1977 I.C. 35-43-5-2 Yes Yes Yes No 
Iowa 1846 1996 I.C.A. 715A.2 Yes Yes No No 
Kansas 1861 2010 K.S.A. 21-5825 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kentucky 1792 1975 K.RS 576.020 Yes Yes Yes No 
Louisiana 1812 2001 LSA-R.S.14:72 Yes Yes Yes No 
Maine 1820 2007 17-A M.R.S.A. 
703 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Maryland 1788 2003 MD CODE  
8-604 
Yes No No No 
 Massachusetts 1788 2013 M.G.L.A.  
267-8* 
M.G.L.A.  
287-21** 
Yes Yes No No 
Michigan 1837 2013 M.C.L.A. 
750.257*** 
No Yes No No 
Minnesota 1858 2006 M.S.A. 609.632 Yes No No No 
Mississippi 1817 2012 MISS. CODE 
ANN. 97-21-13 
Yes No No No 
Missouri 1821 2002 V.A.M.S. 
570.090 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Montana 1889 2009 MCA 45-6-325 Yes Yes Yes No 
Nebraska 1867 1977 Neb. Rev. St.  
28-602 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Nevada 1864 1995 N.R.S. 205-090 Yes Yes Yes No 
New 
Hampshire 
1788 2013 N.H. Rev. 
Stat:638:1 
Yes Yes Yes No 
New Jersey 1787 2002 N.J.S.A. 2C: 
21-1 
Yes Yes Yes No 
New Mexico 1912 2006 N.M.S.A.  
30-16-1c 
No Yes No No 
New York 1788 1965 McKinney’s 
Penal Law 
170.15 
Yes Yes Yes No 
North Carolina 1789 2002 N.C.S.G.A.  
14-119 
Yes Yes Yes No 
North Dakota 1889 1973 NDCC  
12.1-24-01 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Ohio 1803 2011 OHIO R.C. 
2913.32 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Oklahoma 1907 2013 Okl St. Ann 
1577 
Yes Yes No No 
Oregon 1859 2005 O.R.S. 165-013 Yes Yes Yes No 
Pennsylvania 1787 2003 18 Pa.C.S.A. 
4101 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Rhode Island 1790 1956 GEN LAW  
11-17-2 
Yes**** Yes No No 
South 
Carolina 
1788 2002 N.C.G.S.A.  
14-119 
Yes Yes Yes No 
South Dakota 1889 2005 SDCL 22-39-36 Yes Yes Yes No 
Tennessee 1796 2009 T.C.A.  
39-14-115 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Texas 1845 2009 V.T.C.A. 32.21 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Utah 1896 1953 U.C.A. 76-6-518 Yes Yes Yes Yes***** 
Vermont 1791 1981 13 V.S.A. 1804 Yes Yes Yes No 
Virginia 1788 1975 VA CODE 
ANN 8  
18-2-170 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Washington 1889 2011 RCWA 
9A.60.020 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
West 
Virginia 
1863 1923 W.V. Code  
61-4-3 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Wisconsin 1848 2013 W.S.A. 943.38 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wyoming 1890 2007 W.S. 1977  
63-602 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Notes:  
*Florida may be able to regulate counterfeiting virtual currency if other non-criminal statutes are considered. 
**Massachusetts M.G.L.A. 267-8 only applies to bank notes and traveller’s checks; and M.G.L.A. 287-21 only 
applies to currency of the British Provinces of North America. 
***Michigan M.C.L.A. only applies to bank notes. 
****Rhode Island counterfeiting currency laws only applies to Unites States coins (1956 11-17-7). 
*****Utah statute is overly broad and ambiguous, therefor an argument can be made that it encompasses virtual 
currency. 
 
 
Based on the criminal statutes above, States (with the exceptions of New 
Mexico and Michigan) have granted themselves the power to penalize 
counterfeiting United States currency.  Since United States currency is 
composed of both coins and paper, many States have made distinctions 
between coins and paper currency in criminal statutes.  For example, Rhode 
Island’s counterfeiting statutes only applies to United States coins and not 
paper money.  However, jurisdictional limitations may be imposed against a 
State regulating the counterfeiting of United States currency by the United 
States.  This discussion is outside the scope of this paper as it requires a 
comprehensive analysis of not only federal law, but case law as well. 
Most States have the ability to regulate counterfeit bank notes and 
securities.  This is not unusual as the free-banking era created historic 
problems of inflation and liquidity;
265
 and States had a significant interest in 
establishing a better more prosperous economy.  Only Maryland, Minnesota, 
and Mississippi do not have counterfeiting statutes for bank notes. Overall, 
Massachusetts M.G.L.A. 267-8 has the most stringent criminal penalty—life in 
prison—for counterfeiting bank notes and reads as follows: 
Whoever, with intent to injure or defraud, falsely makes, alters, 
 
 265.  Alan Greenspan, Harnessing Market Discipline, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (Sept. 1, 2001), 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/harnessing-market-discipline. 
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forges or counterfeits a bank bill or promissory note payable to the 
bearer thereof or to the order of any person, issued by any 
incorporated banking company or an instrument described as a 
United States Dollar Traveller’s Check or Cheque, purchased from a 
bank or other financially responsible institution, the purpose of 
which is a source of ready money on cashing the instrument without 
identification other than the signature of the purchaser, shall be 
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term 
of years.
266
 
Although thirty-nine states have the ability to regulate counterfeiting non-
U.S. currency, these statutes varied among states. Eleven States (California, 
Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island) do not have the authority to 
regulate counterfeiting non-U.S. currency; and eight of the eleven States have 
revised their counterfeiting statutes within the last ten years.  Even though 
Massachusetts does have the authority to regulate British currency, it is limited 
to the British Provinces of North America that would require significant review 
of Canadian legal systems and United Kingdom Parliamentary Acts;
267
 
therefore, it was interpreted to not be applicable to non-U.S. currency. 
Surprisingly, eight States (Illinois, Kansas, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, and Wisconsin) have counterfeiting statutes that can apply to 
virtual currency.  With the exception of Utah, these States have revised their 
statutes since 2009.  Although Utah last revised its statute in 1953, Utah’s 
statute was the most generally constructed code that can be interpreted to apply 
to any financial instrument, public or private, government and non-government 
issue, or any other security that could be used as a method of exchange. U.C.A. 
76-6-518 Criminal simulation states: 
(1) A person is guilty of criminal simulation if, with intent to 
defraud another: 
(a) he makes or alters an object in whole or in part so that it 
appears to have value because of age, antiquity, rarity, source, or 
authorship that it does not have; 
(b) he sells, passes, or otherwise utters an object so made or 
altered; 
(c) he possesses an object so made or altered with intent to sell, 
pass, or otherwise utter it; or 
(d) he authenticates or certifies an object so made or altered as 
genuine or as different from what it is.
268
 
Although Florida does not have a direct counterfeiting statute that would 
prohibit virtual currency counterfeiting, other non-criminal statutes coupled 
with case law might provide a foundation for the prohibition of counterfeiting.  
Similarly, States may have other non-criminal statutes and case laws defining, 
 
 266.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 267, § 8 (1974). 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-518 (West 1953). 
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clarifying, and further modifying a State’s ability in combating counterfeiting. 
With the lack of Federal regulation upon virtual currencies, it is likely 
that States
269
 will begin regulation of this virtual property based upon their 
respective previous experiences, as defined by significant historical events.
270
  
With respect to the dates that each state entered into the union,
271
 preliminary 
analysis provides some interesting facts concerning the regulation of currency. 
The States (Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, and Virginia) that compose the original thirteen 
colonies do not have the authority to regulate digital currency.  Additionally, in 
considering that geographical borders of States and Nations do not directly 
apply to virtual currencies, geography still applies to people—the users of such 
currencies.  As gaps in Federal regulations concerning virtual currencies exist, 
States may exercise their sovereign rights and those rights not given to the 
Federal government to regulate virtual currencies and the users of virtual 
currencies.  Thus, it is essential that the rights to virtual currencies, as noted in 
our first general requirement, be defined as an intangible personal property.
272
 
Since property rights are significantly important within an economy, legal 
protections including counterfeiting criminalization help ensure consumer 
confidence in the financial instruments used to facilitate exchanges in goods 
and services.  As financial transactions have shifted historically from various 
governments’ legal tender to combinations of government and private 
issuances and from the hard currency of coins and paper to electronic 
transactions, many States’ counterfeiting statutes are unclear or fail to consider 
that technological changes can impact legal and common tender. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Our research indicates that State counterfeiting statutes assign various 
values on financial instruments used as mediums of exchange.  Although 
 
 269.  Press Release, N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., Proposed BitLicense Regulatory Framework for Virtual 
Currency Firms (July 17, 2014), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr1407171.html [hereinafter NYDFS] 
(New York is moving towards the regulation of virtual currencies such as Bitcoin); Tan, supra note 58, at 27 
(this is not surprising as Tan identified New York and West Virginia as having Senators advocating the need 
for the regulation of virtual currencies). 
 270.  We consider that significant historical events can change public policies and economies with a 
greater impact than ongoing operations.  First, historical events can be readily identified—some more than 
others.  Secondly, historical events can be tied to specifics point in time for a further analysis.  Thirdly, 
significant events also test traditional policies, strategies and laws through spirited debates and events.  Finally, 
laws may be more resistant to change significantly unless some historical event has occurred or public policy 
has experienced a paradigm shift.  As with any decision, evidence (historical by nature) is considered and 
evaluated for relatability and for avoiding mistakes. 
 271.  The date each State entered into the Union is the first significant date, which we believe, to help 
shape the laws and traditions of that State.  It is that birth date that helps define an entity or State’s social status 
and identity, an order of precedence and a culture of tradition.  While there are other historical events that can 
be considered, those events are beyond the scope of this paper and should be considered avenue for future 
research. 
 272.  U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The property designation is significantly 
important as Constitutional arguments can be made concerning Due Process and the unlawful taking of such 
property. 
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United States currency is defined as the legal tender of the United States,
273
 
States make varying distinctions in property rights between coins and paper 
notes and in general values of United States currency as expressed in the 
market values when considering the supply of currency, and its demand.  
Concerning the current legal environment surrounding States regulatory power 
regarding virtual counterfeiting, we found that most States do not have direct 
rights to regulate virtual currency except to potentially consider virtual 
currency as intangible personal property or intellectual property which may or 
may not be subject to a trademark or copyright enforcement.
274
  In essence, 
counterfeiting a virtual currency may even be subject to virtual trespassing 
laws assuming a State had enacted such.  However, virtual currency, if created 
by and recognized by a foreign nation, virtual currency may be regulated as a 
non-U.S. currency, assuming that this virtual currency is in fact granted the 
same status as legal tender.
275
 
Although Part IX presents an initial overview of States’ regulatory 
powers with regards to virtual currency, a more detailed analysis needs to be 
performed.  Thus, we present four speculations that would further clarify state 
regulatory powers concerning virtual currency for researcher to consider. 
 First, counterfeiting laws may correspond to when a State entered the 
United States: A Commonwealth, pre-civil war, post-civil war, and 
establishment of the Federal Reserve.
276
  This speculation must also 
consider the conditions in which a State entered the Union and from 
where the State’s legal system originated.  We have already noted that 
the States composing the original colonies do not have the power to 
regulate counterfeiting. 
 Secondly, States that have borders with Mexico and Canada and those 
States also serving as ports of entry (e.g., sea ports, international 
airports, railways, and borders) into the United States may have more 
stringent counterfeiting laws.  Although virtual currency can largely 
ignore such boundaries, most of the counterfeiting statues focus on 
 
 273.  31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2012). 
 274.  Tavakol, supra note 38, at 1224 (“Neither the state laws nor the federal regulations within the 
United States that try to regulate e-money attempt to address the international implications of the e-commerce. 
Yet, e-money necessarily implicates sovereign nations and the global market, creating legal and economic 
challenges on both a national and worldwide scale.”) It should be noted that we identified that UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-6-518 (West 1953) was in force during the above generalization.  We contend that counterfeiting is 
an important and critical aspect of the regulation of currency.  Moreover, other legal provisions (i.e., copyright 
and trademark laws) may be applied to common tender and thus virtual currencies. 
 275.  This concept is beyond the limited scope of this paper. Moreover, significant consideration must be 
given to international law and United States law as it applies or restricts State rights. However, this paper 
presents the foundation for the exploration of these concepts and more. 
 276.  From this review, evidence notes that Massachusetts has the harshest counterfeiting laws. However, 
reviewing the legislative history would provide a better understanding of the justifications and thinking behind 
those laws. For example, Benjamin Franklin received several contracts for printing currency from State 
governments. In fact, exploring the early processes of fiscal policies among the Commonwealths and States 
would provide a deeper understanding of early economic policy with respect to the regulation of currency. 
Moreover, this may provide similarities between hard currencies and virtual currencies. Furthermore, a 
national significant event could trigger and subsequently give rise to the promulgation of rules and the passage 
of laws. For example, the events of 9/11 lead to the passage of P.L. 107-56 The USA Patriot Act of 2001 in 
which significant changes were made to the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. 
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illegal goods and pharmaceuticals.  As these ports of entry are likely 
to be the first to suffer economic damages, they are also more likely to 
enact laws that mitigate damages from counterfeiting.  Additionally, 
the laws constructed, outside of the criminal code of our review, may 
be ambiguous enough to apply to the regulation of virtual currency. 
 Thirdly, States may have alternative laws such as financial 
transactions, electronic signature devices, and electronic commerce 
that may be applicable to counterfeiting.  A much deeper analysis 
must be undertaken to identify relevant State laws that may be 
applicable to virtual transactions.  As Federal agencies, most notably 
the Internal Revenue Service and FinCEN, are defining virtual 
currencies as properties with certain characteristics similar to socks, 
bonds and investments, the argument for State laws pertaining to 
financial transactions being applicable to virtual currencies becomes 
stronger.  Likewise, so do the regulations that involve counterfeit 
goods as goods are provided the legal status of property.  Similar to 
the ambiguity of Utah’s U.C.A. 76-6-518 being able to regulate 
cryptocounterfeiting, it is likely that some current laws focusing on the 
counterfeiting of goods can be applicable to virtual properties. 
 Finally, although the States have the ability by means of State statutes 
to enforce counterfeiting, are these State statutes in conflict with the 
Federal government.  Are users in fact, holders in due course where 
the owner is the United States Treasury?
277
 
Furthermore, as presented in Part IX, only eight States have the ability to 
combat the counterfeiting of virtual currency.  With the recent trends in cyber-
crimes and technological advances in cryptology and security, virtual currency 
has emerged and we believe that the opportunity for securing the rights of 
“virtual entrepreneurs” is now.  Thus, we suggest the following criminal statue 
or similar statute to be incorporated into the criminal or penal code: 
A person is guilty of criminal simulation if, with intent to defraud 
another: that person creates or modifies an instrument that is to be 
used as a medium of exchange and receives goods or services by 
falsely representing said instrument is authentic or otherwise 
genuine. 
Consumer confidence in government-backed legal tender has dropped 
and may have contributed to discussions concerning virtual currency.
278
  
Discussions concerning easier, more effective ways to complete financial 
transactions have taken shape as financial transactions have shifted from hard 
currency to electronic transactions.  Virtual currency is becoming an important 
part of our legal tender.  States, governments, and international entities, must 
 
 277.  To answer this question, a comprehensive review of the Congressional history, as well as 
significant United States Court cases, would have to be examined. Moreover, each regulating authority’s rules 
must be investigated to determine how these laws may be interpreted and applied, at least by one party. 
Furthermore, the arguments of defense against the charge of counterfeiting must be appropriately considered to 
deepen the understanding of the stated question. 
 278.  Angel, supra note 193. 
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address the growing influence of virtual currency, before it becomes a 
significant percentage of the world economy.  At that point it will be too late.  
Regulations, responsibilities, and safe guards should be developed at this stage 
of the virtual currency evolution. 
 
